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THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT
AND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE IN THE
1990'S: MAKING THE CASE FOR
FEDERAL LAND USE TO
PRESERVE COASTAL AREAS
LINDA

A. MALONE*

In 1972, Congress passed the Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA). The passage of the CZMA created a great sense of achievement in many different quarters because for the first time Congress
had declared a national interest in land use decisions previously
viewed as local in nature. The CZMA acknowledged that a rapidly
growing population endangered the fragility and beauty of the coastal
zone. 1 Throughout its history, however, the strength of the CZMA
has been threatened by inadequate funding and eroded by court decisions. As a result, the very existence of the CZMA, perhaps the most
comprehensive effort to combine state and federal land use planning,
was often threatened. 2
The progression of coastal zone management law from 1972 until
its most recent amendments in 1990 presents in stark relief the issues
crucial to effective environmental preservation which have been
avoided studiously by Congress, the courts, and the states during the
brief history of the environmental movement. Is preservation of fragile resources possible without substantive land use restrictions imposed
at the federal level? How is the balance of responsibility for the environment to be struck between the federal and state governments?
• Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary.
I. Coastal Zone Management: Hearing before the Nat'/ Ocean Pol'y Study of the Comm on Commerce, Science, and Transport. of the Senate, tOOth Cong., 1st Sess. I (1987) [hereinafter cited as
"Hearing''].
2. Id at 2.
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When environmental values conflict with private property rights,
which should prevail and how should that policy determination be incorporated into modem jurisprudence under the takings clause?
When environmental preservation only can occur at the expense of
other publicly held values, such as the need for cheap energy, what
mechanisms can reconcile or balance the competing interests?
This article will utilize coastal zone management as a backdrop to
these issues. It will also attempt to demonstrate that avoidance of
these issues is at least partially responsible for the current state of crisis in coastal land and water resources. Such avoidance is responsible,
in a broader sense, for the limited effectiveness of twenty years of environmental regulation. After a comprehensive review of current law
regulating the coastal zone, including the CZMA and recent cases interpreting the CZMA, this article will focus on how these cases and
other practical problems in administration of the CZMA have diminished the effectiveness of the Act. Many of these cases have involved
conflicts between offshore leasing and state coastal protection and the
extent to which a state can restrict private property interests without
running afoul of the constitutional prohibition on taking of private
property without just compensation. In conclusion this article evaluates coastal protection in the context of the broad and difficult issues
of environmental policy still awaiting resolution.
I.

ENVIRONMENTAL COASTAL LAND USE

The United States' coastal zone is rich in resources valued for
transportation, food, water, dilution of waste, and aesthetics. 3 The
coastal zone acts as a buffer for dispersion of pollutants and sediments.
The coasts offer attractive areas for homes and recreation and are
often the site of major ports and industry. 4 Approximately 70% of the
total United States commercial fisheries catch consists of species that
are dependent upon estuarine environments in their life cycle, and an
even greater percentage of the recreational catch is dependent on
estuaries. s
These resource values of the coastal zone depend upon preservation of the various coastal zones' natural character. Yet nearly fiftythree percent of the United States' population lives in counties within
50 miles of the coastline or the Great Lakes. 6 It was predicted that by
3. /d. at 38.
4. /d. at 73.
S. /d. at 45.
6.

NAT'L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION,

U.S.

DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE

FEDERAL COASTAL PROGRAMS REVIEW, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (1981).
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1990 this percentage will climb to 75%. 7 In addition, the United
States has jurisdiction and control over 1.8 million square miles of
continental shelf and slope under which enormous amounts of energy
resources exist. 8 It has been estimated that at least 3.5 billion cubic
feet of gas reserves are offshore. 9 Development in the coastal zone
could, however, result in toxic contamination, eutrophication, contamination by human pathogens, loss and alteration of habitats critical
to living resources, and alterations to circulation and freshwater inftow.10 In addition, the so-called "greenhouse effect," a steady increase in carbon dioxide in the earth's atmosphere, threatens a rise in
global sea level of one to three feet in the next 70 years from the accompanying global climate warming. 11 As a result, the quality of the
coastal environment is on the decline, 12 while the CZMA, the primary
source of environmental coastal protection, continues to be in
jeopardy.
In the Environmental Protection Agency's Near Coastal Water
Strategic Options Paper published in 1986, the EPA states:
Near coastal waters are becoming more and more degraded
despite existing federal, state and local laws and regulations governing coastal and ocean pollution and land and water uses. The
environmental quality of near coastal waters will continue to decline unless changes are made in the way land and water uses affecting them are managed. 13

It was precisely these concerns that triggered passage of the CZMA in
1972. 14 In 1966 the Commission of Marine Science, Engineering and
Resources, 15 known as the Stratton Commission, released a study on
the conflict between development of coastal resources and coastal
preservation. In its final report, 16 the Commission concluded that
7. Yi, Application of the Coastal Zone Management Act to Outer Continental Shelf Lease Sales, 6
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 159, 159 (1982). See also H.R. REP. No. 1012, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4376, 4380.
8. Grosso, Federal Offshore Leasing: States' Concerns Fall on Deaf Ears, 2 FLA. ST. J. OF LAND
UsE & ENVTL. L. 249, 250 (1986).

9. /d.
to. Hearing, supra note I, at 46-47.
I I. /d. at 47.
12. /d. at 46.
13. /d.
14. See generally Mandelker & Sherry, The National Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 7
URB. L. ANN. 119 (1974).
IS. Created by Pub. L. No. 89-454 (1966).
16.
U.S. COMM'N ON MARINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND RESOURCES, OUR NATION AND
THE SEA, A PLAN FOR NATIONAL ACTION 56-57 (1969); see also CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 94TH CONG. 2D SESS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COASTAL
ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED IN 1974 AND 1976 WITH A SECTION BY SECTION
INDEX 2 (Comm. Print

1976).
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states were in the best position to manage coastal resources but that
federal funds should be provided to help states bear the expenses of
administration. These recommendations were essentially incorporated
into the regulation of land and water uses in the CZMA.
Inadequate -and sometimes nonexistent funding,l1 case by case
decisionmaking, state/federal conflicts, uncoordinated planning, pressure for development and energy, insufficient research information,
splintered federal authority, and restrictive court decisions are a few of
the problems that have plagued the CZMA. States have indicated that
they are unable to assume the financial burdens of adnllnistering their
management plans without federal funds. Only a few of the twentynine states with coastal zone management programs are willing to continue their present programs without federal assistance. 18 Absent federal funding, the only remaining incentive for coastal states to
continue their programs, until Congress intervened in 1990, was the
requirement that federal actions be consistent with state programs. 19
This incentive· had been significantly undermined by the Supreme
Court. 20 At the same time, the Reagan administration significantly
expanded the number and size of federal lease sales for Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) energy development. 21 With the recent amendments to the CZMA in 1990, 22 the next few years will be a crucial test
for continuance of coastal zone management.
II.

COASTAL ZoNE MANAGEMENT LAW

The purpose of the CZMA is to preserve the unique values of
coastal lands and waters by encouraging states to devise land and
water use plans for coastal protection. 23 The Act provides funds to
states that develop programs for management of land and water uses
consistent with the Act's standards. The Secretary of Commerce must
17. In 1987, for example, the Senate Appropriation Committee cut the coastal zone management
budget from $40 million to S5 million. Hearing, supra note I, at 44.
18. The only states that have indicated they would continue their current programs without financial assistance are California, Louisiana, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and South Carolina. E. Kaplan &
A. Ritachard, Lessening the Scope of Federal Coastal Zone Management: What's at Stake? I, 21 (June
1982) (Unpublished paper available at Department of Energy and Environment, Brookhaven National
Laboratory).
19. See infra notes 137-147 and accompanying text.
20. See infra note 199.
21. Grosso, supra note 8, at 275.
22. Hearing, supra note I, at 3.
23. Coastal Zone Management Reauthorization Act of 1988, 16 U.S.C. § 1452 (1988). The
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) and Coastal Zone Management Improvement Act of 1980
(CZMI) are administered by the Secretary of Commerce, that authority having been delegated to the
Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management (OCRM) in the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA). See Hearing, supra note I, at 37-38; see also 16 U.S.C. §§ 1453(16), 1454(a).
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approve state programs upon finding that they satisfy the requirements
of sections 305. and 306 of the CZMA. After approval, the Secretary
may award grants to the state for the costs of administration of the
approved state management program. 24 In addition to grants states
obtain for having an approved program, states also benefit from the
requirement that federal agencies, permittees, and licensees must show
that their proposed developments, including certain oil and gas activities on the outer continental shelf, are consistent with the state's management program. 25
A. Definition of the Coastal Zone

The CZMA defines "coastal zones" as
the coastal waters (including the lands therein and thereunder) and
the adjacent shorelands (including the waters therein and thereunder), strongly influenced by each other and in proximity to the
shorelines of the several coastal states, [which] includes islands,
transitional and intertidal areas, salt marshes, wetlands, and
beaches. 26

In 1990 the definition was amended to limit the seaward boundary to the extent of state ownership and title under the Submerged
Lands Act. 27 The zone now extends inland "to the extent necessary to
control shorelands, the uses of which have a direct and significant impact on the coastal waters, and to control those geographical areas
which are likely to be affected by or vulnerable to sea level rise." 28 To
paraphrase, the coastal zone consists ofthe land affected by the waters
and the waters affected by the land. The definition of the coastal zone
is purposefully vague, giving states great discretion in setting their
own jurisdiction. This discretion is necessary because different types
of areas, developed and undeveloped, may exist within a single state's
coastal zone.
Excluded from the definition of coastal zone· is land "the use of
which is by law subject solely to the discretion of or which is held in
trust by the Federal Government, its officers or agents." 29 In Granite
Rock Co. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 30 a mining company sought
to enjoin the coastal commission from requiring a state permit under
24. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1454-1455; see infra II(B).
25. § 1456(c); see infra ll(c).
26. /d. § 1453(1).
27. 43 u.s.c. §§ 1301-1356 (1988).
28. Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 6204,
104 Stat. 1388, 1388 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1453(1) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991)).
29. /d.
30. 768 F.2d 1077 (1985), rev'd, 480 U.S. 572 (1987).
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the California Coastal Act, originally passed to implement the CZMA
in California. The mining, operation at issue was located on an unpatented mining claim on land owned by the federal government in a
national forest. 31 The district court held that the land on which the
company was mining did not fall within the federal exclusion from the
coastal zone. 32 California's permit requirement was upheld on the
grounds that the states have concurrent authority with the federal government over federal lands in the coastal zone, that the mining claim
was not exclusively subject to federal jurisdiction, and that there was
no federal preemption. 33 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the state permit requirement was preempted. The
court found that the Forest Service regulations governing mining in
the national forests preempted the permit requirement. 34 According
to the court, the CZMA was not intended by Congress to change the
status quo for allocation of federal and state power over lands within
the coastal zone. 35 The court relied on the First Iowa 36 doctrine that
federal law establishing a federal permit system for an activity
preempts state law prohibiting the activity without a state permit, but
only if the state permit requirements "intrude into the sphere of federal permit authority." 37 In finding preemption, the court stated that
the Forest Service regulations mandated that the power to prohibit
mining for failure to abide by environmental requirements was to reside in the Forest Service, not the state. 38
The Supreme Court reversed in the Court's only decision to date
strengthening the impact of the CZMA. 39 According to Justice
O'Connor's opinion, 40 the test for preemption is the same as that used
by the Court in other cases in which the Property Clause41 was not
implicated: state law is preempted ( 1) if Congress has evidenced intent
31. 768 F.2d at 1079.
32. /d. It had also been held in another case that the federal land exclusion does not extend to
effects on the surrounding non-federal coastal zone that may be caused by federal activities conducted
on federal lands. Puerto Rico v. Musk.ie, 507 F. Supp. 1035 (D. P.R. 1981), vacated, Marquez-Colon v.
Reagan, 668 F.2d 611 (1st Cir. 1981).
33. 768 F.2d at 1079.
34. /d. at 1083.
35. /d. at 1081.
36. First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
37. 768 F.2d at 1082.
38. /d. at 1083. For further background on mining activity on federal lands, see Burling, Local
Control of Mining Activities on Federal Lands, 21 LAND & WATER L. REV. 33 ( 1986).
39. California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987).
40. O'Connor's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun. 480 U.S. at 574.
41. "Congress shall have the Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." U.S. CoNST., art. IV, § 3,
cl. 2.
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to occupy entirely the given field or, (2) where Congress has not displaced state regulation, (a) state law actually conflicts with federal law,
(b) it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law, or (c)
state law frustrates the purposes and objectives of Congress. 42
As a facial challenge to the permit requirement, no particular
conditions that the California Coastal Commission might impose in
the permit were at issue. 43 According to the Court, the Forest Service
regulations controlling unpatented mining claims in national forests
were not only "devoid of any expression of intent to preempt state law,
but rather appear[ed] to assume that those submitting plans of operation will comply with state laws." 44 Even assuming that the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act45 and National Forest Management Act46 preempt the extension of state land use plans to unpatented mining claims in national forests, Congress did not intend to
preempt "reasonable" state environmental regulation. 47 Justice
O'Connor distinguished land use planning from environmental regulation, stating: "Land use planning in essence chooses particular uses
for the land; environmental regulation, at its core, does not mandate
particular uses of land but requires only that, however the land is
used, damage to the environment is kept within prescribed limits."48
Finally, the federal exclusion from the definition of coastal zone in the
CZMA49 did not apply to Granite Rock's unpatented mining claim.
Relying on the CZMA's non-derogation clause50 and its legislative history, the Court concluded "that even if all federal lands are excluded
from the CZMA definition of 'coastal zone,' the CZMA does not automatically preempt all state regulation of activities on federallands." 51
Justice Powell wrote a separate opinion, joined by Justice Stevens,
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
SO.

480 U.S. at 582.
ld. at 580-581.
ld. at 583.
43 u.s.c. §§ 1701-1784 (1988).
16 u.s.c. §§ 1600- 1614 (1988).
480 U.S. at 588-589.
/d. at 587.
16 u.s.c. § 1453(1) (1985).
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed( I) to diminish either Federal or state jurisdiction, responsibility, or rights in the field
of planning, development, or control of water resources, submerged lands, or navigable
waters; nor to displace, supersede, limit or modify any interstate compact or the jurisdiction
or responsibility of any legally established joint or common agency of two or more states or
of two or more states and the Federal Government; nor to limit the authority of Congress
to authorize and fund projects....

16 U.S.C. § 1456(e)(l) (1988).
5 l. 480 U.S. at 594. A consistency certification could not be required because the mining claim
was an unlisted activity for which 30 days notice from California of intent to review had not been given.
/d. at 593.
·
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concurring in part and dissenting in part. 52 Justice Powell agreed with
the majority on the procedural issues raised prior to consideration of
the merits, but disagreed with the majority's distinction between land
use and environmental regulation. 53 Failing to see a difference between environmental regulation and land use, Justice Powell concluded that Congress had entrusted the balancing of mineral
development· and environmental protection in the national forests to
the Forest Service under the National Forest Management Act and
Federal Land Policy and Management Act. 54 He also criticized the
majority for giving so little weight to the location of the mine in a
national forest and the comprehensiveness of the federal statutes authorizing the mining permit, ss but expressed no view as to the Court's
interpretation of the CZMA as not preempting state regulation in the
case. 5 6
Justice Scalia and Justice White dissented on the merits, contending that the case should have been decided on narrower and simpler
grounds than those advanced by the majority. 57 Viewing California's
permit requirement as a land use, not environmental, control, these
Justices contended that preemption applied because state land use regulation of federal land is preempted by federal law. 58 Justice Scalia
referred to the California Coastal Act 59 and concluded that the California Coastal Act and the CZMA are primarily land use regulations. 60 Even assuming that California would use the permit
requirement to enforce environmental laws, California could not do so
unless it. had land use authority over the federal land in question. 61
California did not have land use authority over the mining claim in a
national forest, according to Justice Scalia, because Congress intended
for federal officials to have exclusive authority under NFMA and
FLPMA, as well as the CZMA. 62 Although Justice Scalia agreed with
the majority that the CZMA did not change the status quo with regard to state authority over federal lands, he determined that the fed52. 480 U.S. at 594 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).
53. /d. at 594 (Powell, J., con9urring and dissenting).
54. Jd. at 602-603 n.5 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).
55. /d. at 605 n.6 (Powell, J.•. concurring and dissenting).
S6. Jd.
57. /d. at 607 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
58. /d.
59. Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. 30,000 et seq. (West 1986).
60. 480 U.S. at 610 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. Justice Scalia believed that the evidence showed that California did have land use interests in
addition to environmental concerns. /d. at 612-613 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 612-613 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissenters point out that the argument that the
land is not excluded from the CZMA was not "pressed" before the Court, and was rejected by both the
lower courts. /d. (Scalia, 1., dissenting).
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eral lands exclusion and consistency review provisions demonstrate
that the status quo was exclusive federal authority. 63
The importance of Granite Rock goes beyond the limited context
of mining claims on federal land in the coastal zone. The Court's reliance on the non-derogation clause in the CZMA may have broad implications for federal preemption of state coastal regulation. However,
the case does little to clarify the precise scope of state authority over
federal land in the coastal zone or to clarify whether state power under
the CZMA for private activity on federal land is limited to consistency
review. Also, the Court failed to decide whether federal land was excluded from the coastal zone under section 304(a). In a more general
context, one of the most important questions after Granite Rock is
whether the state can enforce its permit requirement through injunctive relief. It would seem from the opinion that so long as the state's
regulation is environmental, the state could seek injunctive relief to
enforce the permit requirement. Thus, the most common issue as to
state authority after Granite Rock will be whether state coastal regulation is environmental or land use regulation.
The Court avoided the issue of whether a state could deny a permit or condition a permit on compliance, insofar as the case only involved a facial challenge to the permit requirement. The answer may
depend upon whether the state's requirements are unreasonable or so
severe as to be a regulatory taking. It' may also be that Granite Rock
applies only to state permit requirements, not to local or county permit requirements. Outside of the coastal zone context, Granite Rock
indicates that preemption issues involving federal land are the same as
in other contexts not involving federal land. Given all the unanswered
questions after Granite Rock, however, states would be wise to continue involvement and input in federal land use planning, in addition
to establishing their own permit systems.
Because the Court did not have to decide whether federal land is
excluded from the coastal zone under section 304(a), it also avoided
the issue of when consistency review is required under section
307(c)(3)(A) for activities on federal land affecting the state's coastal
zone. The Supreme Court in Secretary of the Interior v. California, 64
since modified by the 1990 amendments to the CZMA, 65 in~icated
that for purposes of section 307(c)(l) consistency review, activities by
federal agencies on federal land located within the coastal zone must
63.
64.
65.
104 Stat.

/d. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
464 u.s. 312 (1984).
Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 6208,
1388, 1388-307 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c)(1) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991)).
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be reviewed for consistency if they affect the coastal zone, although
this difference may be explained by the differing language in sections
307(c)(3)(A) and 307(c)(l). Nevertheless, in spirit the Court in Granite Rock seems less than certain about the reach of consistency review
for activities on federal lands physically situated within a state coastal
zone.
B. Overview of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 and
the Coastal Zone Management Improvement Act of
1980

Under the CZMA, coastal states66 are given grants for the development and administration of federally approved state management
programs for coastal zones. 67 As of 1989, 29 out of 35 states eligible
under the CZMA had approved management programs. 68 From 1974
to 1985, 187 million dollars was provided to coastal states in the form
of grants. 69 The 1990 amendments increased appropriations for the
CZMA program for the years 1991 to 1995. 70 Approval of state programs is made through the Assistant Administrator of the Office of
Coastal Zone Management (now known as the Office of Ocean and
Coastal Resource Management'') and is dependent upon satisfaction
of four general requirements: (1) the program must provide for management of land and water uses having a direct and significant impact
on coastal waters 72 and take steps to assure appropriate protection of
significant resources and areas, such as wetlands, beaches, dunes, and
66. "Coastal state" is generally defined as a state in or bordering on the Atlantic, Pacific, or
Arctic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, Long Island Sound, or any of the Great Lakes, Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the U.S. trust territory of the Pacific Islands. 16 U.S.C.
§ 14S3(4) (1988).
67. 16 CoASTAL ZoNE MOMT. NEWSL. 4 (Mar. 28, 198S). A management program apparently
has little or no legal effect until approved. City and County of San Francisco v. United States, 443 F.
Supp. 1116 (N.D. Cal. 1977), ajf'd, 61S F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1980); Enos v. Marsh, 616 F. Supp. 32 (D.
Haw. 1984), aff'd, 769 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 198S); see also Quinones Lopez v. Coco Lagoon Dev. Corp.,
S62 F. Supp. 188 (D. P.R. 1983). Once the Secretary approves a program, that approval continues
indefinitely until the next time the Secretary reviews the program. 16 U.S.C. § 14S8 (1988); see also
Norfolk S. Corp. v. Oberly, 632 F. Supp. 122S (D. Del. 1986), aff'd, 822 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1987).
68. 16 CoASTAL ZoNE MOMT. NEWSL. 4 (Mar. 28, 198S).
69. Under §§ 30S & 306, development grants for program costs may be made annually to any
coastal state demonstrating that the funds will be used to develop a final management program in
accord with 16 U.S.C. § 14SS (1988). Additional grants will only be made to states that "satisfactorily
develop" their management programs. Coastal states may also be eligible for funding to complete
management programs which are not yet approved. See infra notes 83-87.
70. 16 u.s.c. § 1464.
71. See note 6, supra.
72. The term "coastal waters" is defined as "(A) in the Great Lakes area, the waters within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States consisting of the Great Lakes, their connecting waters,
harbors, roadsteads, and estuary-type areas such as bays, shallows, and marshes and (B) in other areas,
those waters adjacent to the shoreline, which contain a measurable quantity or percentage of sea water,
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barrier islands, that make the states' coastal zone a unique, vulnerable,
or valuable area; (2) the program must contain three broad classes of
policies that are related to resource protection, management of coastal
development, and simplification of governmental processes; (3) the
policies must be appropriate to the nature and degree of management
related to uses, areas, and resources identified as subject to the program; and (4) the policies, standards, objectives, criteria, and procedures by which program decisions will be made must provide a clear
understanding of the content of the program, especially in identifying
who will be affected by the program and how, as well as a clear sense
of direction and predictability for decisionmakers who must take actions pursuant to or consistent with the management program. 73
Under the second requirement the regulations require, among other
things, inclusion of policies that provide the framework for various
management techniques and authorities and policies that address uses
of or impacts on wetlands and floodplains in accordance with Executive Order No. 11,990 for wetlands and Executive Order No. 11,988
for floodplains. 74
Additionally, every management program must satisfy the following substantive requirements: (1) identification of the boundaries of
the coastal zone subject to the management program; 75 (2) a definition of what constitutes permissible land and water uses that have a
direct and significant impact on the coastal waters; 76 (3) an inventory
and designation of areas of particular concern; 77 (4) identification of
including, but not limited to, sounds, bays, lagoons, bayous, ponds, and estuaries." 16 U.S.C. § 1453(3)
(1988).
73. 15 C.F.R. § 923.3(b)(l) - (4) (1990).
74. ld. § 923.3(b)(2)(i) - (ii).
75. There are four elements to a state's boundary: "the inland boundary, the seaward boundary,
areas excluded from the boundary, and in most cases, interstate boundaries." ld. § 923.30(b). The
inland boundary must include: (1) those areas the management of which is necessary to control uses
which have direct and significant impacts on coastal waters, designated areas of special concern, waters
under saline influence, salt marshes and wetlands, beaches, transitional and intertidal areas, and islands.
The inland boundary must be presented clearly enough to permit determination of whether property or
an activity is located within the management area. The boundary may be defined in terms of political
jurisdiction, but states must be able to advise interested parties within 30 days of receipt of an inquiry
whether they are subject to the management program. ld. § 923.3l(a). Beyond those areas required as
above, states have the option of including within the coastal zone: watersheds, areas of tidal influence
that extend further inland than waters under saline influence, and Indian lands not held in trust by the
federal government. ld. § 923.31(b).
The regulations clarify seaward boundaries in 15 C.F.R. § 923.32. States must exclude lands
owned, leased, held in trust, or otherwise used solely by federal agencies. Excluded federal lands do not
remove from federal agencies the obligation of the consistency provisions of§ 307 when federal actions
in such lands have impacts that significantly affect coastal zone areas, uses, or resources of the state's
management program. Jd. § 923.33.
76. 16 u.s.c. § 1455(d)(2).
77. Id.
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the means to exert control over land and water uses, including a listing
of relevant constitutional provisions, laws, regulations, and judicial decisions; (5) broad guidelines or priorities of uses in particular areas
including specifically those of lowest priority; (6) a description of organizational structure proposed to implement the program, including the
responsibilities and interrelationships of local, areawide, state, regional
and interstate agencies in the management process; (7) a definition of
the term "beach" 78 and a planning process for the protection of, and
access to, public beaches and other public coastal areas of environmental, recreational, historical, aesthetic, ecological, or cultural value; (8)
a planning process for energy facilities likely to be located in, or which
may significantly affect, the coastal zone, including, but not limited to,
a process for anticipating and managing the impacts from such facilities; 79 and (9) a planning process for assessing the effects of shoreline
erosion80 and studying and evaluating ways to control, or lessen the
impact of, such erosion and to restore areas adversely affected by such
erosion. 81 The regulations require that an environmental impact statement, prepared in accordance with the National Environmental Policy
78. The management program must contain a procedure for assessing public beaches and other
public areas, there must be a definition of the term "beach" thai is the broadest definition allowable
under state law or constitutional provisions, as well as an identification of public areas meeting that
definition, and an identification and description of enforceable policies, legal authorities, funding programs and other techniques that will be used to provide such shorefront access and protection that the
state's planning process indicates is necessary. 15 C.P.R. § 923.24(c).
79. For a discussion of the Supreme Court decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825 (1987), deciding the access issue in a taking context, see III, infra. The planning process
required must include identification of energy facilities which are likely· to locate in, or which may
"significantly aft'ect" a state's coastal zone. 16 U.S.C. § 1454(b)(8) (1988). States must consider at a
minimum those facilities listed in § 304(5) (the definition of coastal energy activity in 16 U.S.C.
§ 1453(5) (1988)) of the Act, and, at a minimum "significantly affect" shall be defined in terms of
substantial or potentially substantial changes in coastal zone resources which could be aft'ected by a
proposed energy facility, including changes in land, air, water, mineral, flora, fauna, noise, and objects
of historic, cultural, archaeological or aesthetic significance. IS C.P.R.§ 923.13(b)(l) (1990). In addition, the process must include procedures for assessing the suitability of sites for energy facilities, articulation and identification of enforceable state policies, authorities and techniqu~ for managing energy
facilities and their impacts, and identification of how interested and aft'ected public and private parties
will be involved in the planning process. Jd. § 923~13(b)(2)-(4).
For further discussion of the requirement of consistency as applicable to siting of energy facilities,
see Kanouse, Achieving Federalism in the Regulation of Coastal Energy Facility Siting, 8 EcOLOGY L.Q.
533 (1980); see generally Randle, Coastal Energy Dilemmas, 21 NAT. RESOURCES 1. 126 (1981).
80. Special management of erosion may be achieved either by designating erosion areas as "areas
of particular concern" pursuant to 15 C.P.R.§ 923.21 (1990), or as areas for "preservation or restoration" pursuant to 15 C.P.R. § 923.22 (1990). ld. § 923.25(b). There must be a method for assessing the
effects of shoreline erosion and evaluating techniques for mitigating, controlling, or restoring areas
adversely aft'ected by erosion; and an identification of enforceable policies, legal authorities, funding
techniques, and other techniques to manage the erosion as indicated to be necessary by the State's
planning process. ld. § 923.25(c).
81. 16 u.s.c. § 1455(d)(2) (1988).
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Act, accompany the state's management program. 82 The regulations
provide some guidance in defining permissible land and water uses
that have a direct and significant impact on coastal waters under the
second requirement listed above.
The CZMA provides for "management program development
grants" under section 305 83 and "administrative grants" under section
306. 84 Although the statutory language is confusing, grants are made
under section 305 for a state to develop a final management program.
When that program is approved by the OCRM, the state is eligible for
further grants under section 306 to implement and administer the
program.
Development grants may be made annually to any coastal state
that demonstrates that the grant will be used to develop a management
program satisfying the requirements of 16 U.S.C. § 1455 (section 306)
for approved management programs. 85 Annual grants of up to
$200,000 are available on a four-to-one, federal-state matching fund
basis for development of state management programs in fiscal years
1991, 1992, and 1993. No state may receive more than two grants. 86
After a development grant is first approved for a coastal state, no subsequent grants may be made unless the state is "satisfactorily developing its management program. " 87
When a management program is completed by the state, approved by the Secretary of Commerce, and ready for full implementation, further grants are determined by the provisions of section 1455
(section 306 of the Act) for administrative grants. 88 Grants for administration may be given to the state if the Secretary finds the substantive
requirements of section 1455(d)(2) for management programs are met
and approves the state's management program. 89 Prior to granting
82. 15 C.P.R. § 923.72(a) (1990). The requirements of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act
must also be incorporated into the program and are the controlling pollution requirements. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1456(!) ( 1988). For a helpful case discussion of the interrelationship between coastal regulation and
NEPA, see Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Santa Barbara, 52 Cal. 3d· 553, 801 P.2d 1161, 276 Cal. Rptr.
410 (1990).
83. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1454(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991).
84. /d. § 1455(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991).
85. /d. § 1454(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991).
86. /d.
87. /d.
88. /d. § 1455.
89. /d. § 1455(b). Generally, the costs of administering a program include costs incurred in carrying out, in a manner consistent with the Act, projects and other activities that are necessary or
appropriate to the implementation of the program.
Under the 1990 amendments, states with approved programs prior to enactment of the amendments are entitled to federal funding on a one-to-one ratio for any fiscal year. /d. § 1455(a)(l). For
programs approved after enactment, states may receive federal funds on a four-to-one ratio of federal-
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approval, the Secretary must also find that:
( 1) the management program has been adopted in accordance
with the applicable regulations after notice and with the opportunity of full participation by the relevant federal agencies, 90 state agencies, local governments, regional
organizations, port authorities, and other public and private
interested parties; 91
(2) the state has held public hearings in its development; 92
(3) the management program and any changes have been reviewed and approved by the Governor; 93
(4) the Governor of the state has designated a single agency to
receive and administer the administrative grarits; 94
(5) the state is organized to implement the management
program; 95
(6) the state has the authority necessary to implement the
program; 96
(7) the management program provides for adequate consideration of the national interest involved in planning for, and in
the siting of, facilities (including energy facilities in, or which
significantly affect, such state's coastal zone) that are necessary to meet requirements that are not local in nature; 97 and
to-state contributions for the first fiscal year, 2.3-to-1 for the second year, l.S-to-1 for the third year and
one-to-one thereafter. /d. § 1455(aX2).
90. "(R]elevant Federal agencies" are those agencies with "programs, activities, projects, regulatory, financing, or other assistance responsibilities in the following fields which could impact or affect a
State's coastal zone: (i) Energy production or transmission, (ii) Recreation of more than local nature,
(iii) Transportation, (iv) Production of food and fiber, (v) Preservation of life and property, (vi) National defense, (vii) Historic, cultural, aesthetic, and conservation values, (viii) Mineral resources and
extraction, and (ix) Pollution abatement and control." IS C.P.R. § 923.2(d)(1) (1990). The regulations
specifically define "relevant Federal agencies" to include the following departments: Agriculture; Commerce; Defense; Energy; Health; Education and Welfare; Housing and Urban Development; Interior;
Transportation; the Environmental Protection Agency; the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission;
the General Services Administration; and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. /d. § 923.2(d)(2).
"Relevant Federal agencies" and "Federal agencies" principally affected are given the same meaning
under the regulations. /d. § 923.2(e).
91. 16 U.S.C.A. § 14SS(d)(l) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991).
92. /d. § 1455(d)(4).
93. Id. § 1455(dXS).
94. /d. § 1455(d)(6).
95. /d. § 1455(d)(7).
96. /d. § 145S(d)(IO). Authority for the management of the coastal zone in accordance with the
management program includes the power to: (I) administer land and water use regulations, control
development to ensure compliance with the management program, and resolve conflicts among compet·
ing uses; and (2) acquire fee simple and less than fee simple interests in lands, waters, and other property through condemnation or other means when necessary to achieve conformance with the
management program. /d.
97. /d. § 145S(d)(8). Where energy facilities are necessary to meet requirements that are not
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(8) the management program makes provision for procedures
whereby specific areas may be designated for the purpose of
preserving or restoring them for their conservation, recreational, ecological, or aesthetic values. 98
One troublesome aspect of these requirements is that the state must
designate an agency to receive federal funds and an agency with the
authority to implement the state program, but there is no indication
that these two agencies need be the same agency.
In addition, for approval of a management program the state
must have coordinated the program with local, area-wide, and interstate plans applicable to areas within the coastal zone existing on January 1 of the year in which the management program is submitted to
the Secretary. 99 The state also must establish an "effective mechanism" for continuing consultation and coordination between the designated management agency and local governments, interstate agencies,
regional agencies, and area-wide agencies within the coastal zone to
assure the full participation of such governments and agencies. 100
A mechanism for consultation shall not be considered "effective"
unless three additional requirements will be met. First, the management agency for the state program is required "before implementing
any management program decision which would conflict with any local zoning ordinance, decision, or other action, [to] send a notice of
such management program decision to any local government whose
zoning authority is affected" thereby. 101 Second, the notice must provide that such local government may, "within the thirty-day period
commencing on the date of receipt of such notice, . . . submit to the
management agency written comments on the management program
decision, and any recommendation or alternatives," unless such local
purely local, the Secretary must find that the state has given such consideration to any applicable
interstate energy plan or program. /d.
98. /d. § 1455(d)(9).
99. /d. § 1455(d)(3)(A)(i).
100. /d. § 1455(d)(3)(b). In Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646 (D. P.R. 1979), modified sub
nom. Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981), Puerto Rico
sought to enjoin the United States Navy from carrying out naval training operations on the lands
owned by the Territory. Puerto Rico argued that such exercises were inconsistent with the island's
management program. The court avoided the issue of whether there was any exclusion of federal lands
and did not apply any "directly affecting" threshold test (later in Brown v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359
(C.D. Cal. 1981), modified sub nom. California v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1254 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom.
Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984), the district court would focus first on
whether the activity directly affected the coastal zone and, second, whether there was consistency).
Instead the court focused on the second requirement that agency action be consistent "to the maximum
extent practicable" with the territorial management program and concluded that adverse effects from
the naval bombardments were de minimis.
101. 16 U.S.C. § 145S(d)(3)(B)(i) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991).
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government waives its right to comment. 102 Third, the management
agency, if comments are submitted to it within the thirty-day period, is
required to consider any such comments, is authorized in its discretion
to hold a public hearing on such comments, and may not take any
action within the thirty-day period to implement the management program decisions, whether or not modified on the basis of such comments. 103 A state may modify or amend an approved management
plan so long as the original plan requirements are met. 104 Under the
1990 amendments, an approved management program may be
amended if: (1) the state promptly notifies the Secretary of the change
and submits it for approval with funding subject to suspension by the
Secretary pending submission; (2) within 30 days of receiving the
change, the Secretary notifies the state of approval or disapproval or
that it is necessary to extend review up to 120 days from receipt of this
change (an extension of the 120-day period only being available for
meeting the National Environmental Policy Act); and (3) the state
does not implement any change until after it has been approved by the
Secretary. ws
Before granting approval, the Secretary must make a finding that
the program provides for any one or a combination of designated general techniques for control of land and water uses within the coastal
zones and for a method of assuring that local land and water use regulations within the coastal zone do not unreasonably restrict or exclude
land and water uses of regional benefit. 106
The state is given a choice among three methods of regulation in
its program. The designated techniques for control of land and water
uses are: (1) state establishment of criteria and standards for local implementation, subject to administrative review and enforcement of
compliance; (2) direct state land and water use planning and regulation; and (3) state administrative review for consistency with the management program of all development plans, projects, or land and water
regulations, including exceptions and variances thereto proposed by
any state or local authority or private developer, with power to approve or disapprove after public notice and an opportunity for
hearing. 107
Approval of a management program is key to receiving the two
102. Id. § 1455(d)(3)(B)(ii).
103. Id. § 1455(d)(3)(B)(iii).
104. /d. § 1455(e).
105. /d.
106. /d. § 1455b(e). "Water use" is any "use, activity, or project conducted in or on waters
within the coastal zone." /d. § 1453(18).
107. /d. § 1455(d)(11XA)- (C).
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incentives provided to coastal states in the Act-funding and federal
consistency. Criticism has been leveled at the inherent assumption in
the Act that policy requirements and standards are sufficient to protect an environmental resource. Yet, if the requirements for state programs were more specific, the CZMA would come close to the most
controversial form of land control-federal land control. The passage
of the CZMA was possible because the Act required state programs to
implement federal policy rather than federal regulations. The state
may still choose the mix of land and water uses in its program to
achieve the CZMA's objectives.
C. Additional Funding and Compliance Under the CZMA

In cases of "serious disagreement" between any federal agency
and the coastal state in the development of a management program
under section 1454 or in the administration of a final management program approved under section 1455, "the Secretary, with the cooperation of the Executive Office of the President, shall seek to mediate the
differences," including public hearings conducted in the local area
concemed. 108 The procedure, however, is completely voluntary. 109
The regulations indicate that judicial review may be sought by any
party to a serious disagreement without first having exhausted the mediation process. 110
To ensure compliance, the Act requires the Secretary to conduct
a continuing review of the performances of the coastal states. 111 Each
review must include a written evaluation with an assessment and detailed findings on the extent to which a state has implemented and
enforced the program, addressed the coastal management needs identified in section 1452(2)(A)-(K), and complied with the terms of any
108. 16 U.S.C. § 14S6(h) (198S). For a state's coastal zone management program that includes
requirements as to shorelands also subject to any federally supported national land use program, the
Secretary of Commerce must obtain concurrence to that part of the program by the Secretary of the
Interior or such other designated federal administrator of the land use program prior to approval of the
program. /d. § 14S6(g).
109. IS C.F.R. §§ 930.110- 930.116 (1990).
II 0. /d. § 930.116. One court has required a corporation to exhaust its administrative remedies
under the CZMA before resorting to the courts. Acme Fill Corp. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation &
Dev. Comm'n, 187 Cal. App. 3d IOS6, 232 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1986).
In Exxon Corp. v. Fischer, 807 F.2d 842,844-47 (9th Cir. 1986), modified, 817 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir.
1987), the Ninth Circuit held that Exxon was estopped from challenging in court California's finding of
inconsistency when the Secretary of Commerce had already reviewed and affirmed California's finding
of inconsistency under IS C.F.R. § 930.121. 807 F.2d 842, 844-41. The court did not decide whether
Exxon was required to have submitted the issue to the Secretary first, or could have bypassed administrative review and challenged the finding in district court. /d. at 846.
Ill. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1458(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991).
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grant, loan, or cooperative agreement funded under the Act. 112 In
evaluating compliance, the Secretary must conduct public meetings
and provide an opportunity for oral and written comments by the public, with the final report also being made available to the public. 113
The Secretary may suspend payments from between six and 36
months and may withdraw further payments if a state is failing to
comply with its section 315 program for a national estuarine reserve,
or a portion of the state's approved management program, or the
terms of any grant or cooperative agreement funded under the
CZMA. 114 Before suspension the Secretary must provide the governor
of the state with written specifications and a schedule for the actions
that need to be taken and written specifications for how the suspended
payments must be expended to take the necessary actions. 11 ' Suspension of funding can be made permanent by the Secretary if the state
fails to take the necessary corrective actions. 116
112. /d.
113. /d. § 14S8(b).
114. /d. § 14S8(c).
!IS. Id. § 14S8(cX2).
116. /d. § 14S8(d). It has been held that the CZMA is neither a jurisdictional grant nor a basis
for stating a claim for relief. Town of North Hempstead v. Village of North Hills, 482 F. Supp. 900
(E.D.N.Y. 1979); see also Massachusetts v. Andrus, S94 F.2d 872, 880 & n.9 (1st Cir. 1979); but see
Enos v. March, 616 F. Supp. 32 (D. Haw. 1984), a.ff'd, 769 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1985). The only
sanction for noncompliance with the formal requirements of the CZMA is termination or reduction of
program funding. See Save Our Dunes v. Pegues, 642 F. Supp. 393, 401 (M.D. Ala. 198S) (citing 16
U.S.C. §§ 14SS(g) and 14S8(d) (1988), rev'd sub nom. Save our Dunes v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl.
Management, 834 F.2d 984 (lith Cir. 1987), vacated sub nom. Save Our Dunes v. Pegues, 691 F. Supp.
1338 (M.D. Ala. 1988)). CZMA requires under § 14S8(d) "withdrawal of financial assistance only if
the state's deviation is unjustified and the state refuses to remedy the deviation." 642 F. Supp. at 402.
Under former section 14SS(g), if a state amended or modified its approved program, no further section
14SS(g) grants could be made to implement its approved program until the amendment or modification
was approved. 16 U.S.C. § 14SS(g) (1988). In Save Our Dunes, however, the court used its equitable
powers and refused to remedy a violation of section 14SS(g). 642 F. Supp. at 402.
A state also may impose penalties for violations under state Jaw. In Government of the Virgin
Islands, Dep't of Conservation v. Virgin Islands Paving, 714 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1983), the standard for
issuance of a preliminary injunction under the Virgin Islands Coastal Zone Management Act was questioned when an enforcement proceeding was brought in federal court. The defendants allegedly conducted quarry operations in the coastal zone without a permit, and the plaintilfs therefore sought
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, as well as civil penalties. The district court concluded that
the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction was Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6S(a): threat of
irreparable harm, likelihood of success on the merits, and lack of an adequate remedy at law. /d. at
28S. The court of appeals refused to accept this test, or one proposed by the government that merely
required a prima facie showing of a violation. The court of appeals said the district was sitting as a
local court enforcing Virgin Islands law. /d. at 28S-86. Although the Federal Rules applied, it was
appropriate to consider local interests as expressed in the coastal law in evaluating irreparable harm
and in balancing equities. ld. at 286.
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D. Coastal Zone Enhancement Grants and the Coastal Nonpoint
Pollution Control Program

The 1990 Amendments to the CZMA created the Coastal Zone
Enhancement Grant (CZEG) program. 117 These grants are to be provided to coastal states for the purpose of attaining any one or more of
eight enumerated coastal zone enhancement objectives. 118 These
objectives are: 1) protection of existing coastal wetlands or creation of
new coastal wetlands; 2) minimization or elimination of development
in natural hazard areas in order to protect life and property; 3) increased public access to coastal areas having recreational, historical,
aesthetic, ecological, or cultural value; 4) reduction of marine debris
through increased management of uses and activities which contribute
to the presence of such debris in the coastal and ocean environment; 5)
development and adoption of procedures to control the cumulative
and secondary impacts created by coastal growth and development; 6)
preparation and implementation of special area management plans for
important coastal areas; 7) planned use of ocean resources; and 8)
adoption of enforceable procedures and policies regarding the siting of
coastal energy and government facilities having greater than local
significance. 119
Coastal states requesting a coastal zone enhancement grant must
submit a proposal for funding to the Secretary, who will then rank the
proposals based upon procedural criteria as well as upon the fiscal and
technical needs of each state and the overall merit, in terms of public
benefits, of the proposal. 120 The procedural criteria must be adopted
within twelve months of the enactment of the CZMA amendments,
following the notice and comment requirements set out in section
317. 121 The regulations so promulgated must include: 1) specific and
detailed criteria to be addressed by a coastal state regarding implementation of the coastal zone enhancement objectives; 122 2) administrative
and procedural rules to aid "the development and implementation of
such objectives by coastal states"; 123 and 3) any other funding award
criteria necessary to ensure that grants are awarded on the basis of
objective standards that can be applied "fairly and equitably" to all
117. Coastal Zone Act rteauthorization Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 6210,
104 Stat. 1388, 1388-309 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456b (West 1985 & Supp. 1991)).
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

U.S.C.A. § 1456h(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991).
§ 1456b(a).
§ 1456b(c)
§ 1456b(d).
§ 1456b(d)(l).
/d. § 1456b(d){2).
16
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
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proposals. 124
The primary benefit to coastal states under the CZEG program is
that they are not required to contribute to the cost of any program
funded under the grant. 125 There is, however, an annual cap of
$10,000,000 to the amount that may be awarded to all proposals
within a single fiscal year beginning with the 1991 fiscal year. 126 In
addition, the Secretary may not grant less than 10% and no more than
20% of all funds appropriated to implement section 306 and 306A to
fund the enhancement grants program. 127 Funded states are required
to undertake the actions for which funding was provided under the
CZEG program or else have their eligibility for further funding suspended by the Secretary for at least one year. 128
The 1990 amendments also require every state with a federally
approved program to develop a program to implement coastal land
use management measures for controlling nonpoint source pollution. 129 The Administrator of EPA must publish national guidelines
on "management measures" to control coastal nonpoint sources. 130
"Management measures" are defined as "economically achievable
measures" for the control of pollutants from new and existing
nonpoint sources that reflect the "greatest degree of pollutant reduction achievable" through application of the best available nonpoint
pollution control practices and other methods. 131 States must submit
their programs to the Secretary and the Administrator of EPA within
30 months of publication of the national guidelines. 132 After approval,
the state must implement the program through changes in the state
plan for control of nonpoint source pollution approved under section
319 of the Clean Water Act 133 and through changes in the state's
coastal zone management program. 134 If the state fails to submit an
approved program, the Secretary may withhold a percentage of any
section 306 grant under the CZMA, and EPA may withhold portions
of any section 319 grant under the Clean Water Act.m Grants are
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
104 Stat.
130.
131.
land and
132.
133.
134.
135.

/d. § 1456b(d)(3).
/d. § 1456b(e).
/d. § 1456b(f).
/d.
/d. § 1456b(g).
Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 6217,
1388, 1388-314 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1455b (West 1985 & Supp. 1991)).
16 U.S.C.A. § 1455b(g)(l) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991).
/d.§ 1455b(g)(5). A state's coastal zone boundaries may be modified to assure control of all
water uses that have a significant impact on state coastal waters. /d. § 1455b(e).
/d. § 1455b(a)(l).
33 u.s.c. § 1329 (1988).
16 U.S.C.A. § 1455b(c)(2) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991).
/d. § 1455b(c)(3) & (4).
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available for up to SO% of the costs of developing these coastal
nonpoint pollution control programs. 136

E. Federal Participation and Consistency Review
A major incentive for states to have management programs is the
requirement that certain federal activities be consistent with state
management programs. The quid pro quo from states for the benefit of
federal consistency with state programs is that states must adequately
consider input from federal agencies in formulating state management
programs. The Secretary may not approve any management program
pursuant to section 306 unless the views of federal agencies principally
affected by the program have been adequately considered. 137 Each
state must provide an opportunity for full partiCipation by relevant
federal agencies, local governments, and other interested parties. 138
There are five categories of federal activities subject to consistency review: (1) activities conducted or supported by a federal agency
"affecting any land or water use or natural resource of the coastal
zone"; (2) federal development projects "in the coastal zone"; (3) federally licensed and permitted activities "affecting any land or water
use or natural resource of the coastal zone"; (4) federally licensed or
136. Jd. § 14SSb(t).
137. Jd. § 14S6(h). However, under IS C.P.R. § 923.SI(d) (1990), states have to include only
those concerns that are "appropriate in the opinion of the State." Implementation of this vague requirement is as difficult as it sounds. In American Petroleum Inst. v. Knecht, 456 F. Supp. 889 (C.D.
Cal. 1978), aff'd per curiam, 609 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1979), the court upheld the Secretary's approval
of California's coastal zone management program despite a challenge from the oil industry that the
program inadequately considered the national interest in energy development. The eourt held that the
primary concern of the CZMA is environmental protection and that energy needs are merely one of
several factors to be balanced against environmental concerns. 456 F. Supp. at 922-927. The court also
held that standard of judicial review for federal approval of a management program is the arbitrary and
capricious standard. Jd. at 904. The Court rejected having programs so specific as to inform persons
conducting activities in the coastal zone of the rules and conditions of compliance, because the CZMA
did not require "detailed criteria" for private developers. Jd. at 919. See also id., 609 F.2d at 1312.
In the legislative history of the 1990 amendments, the House conference report emphasizes that
none of the amendments made to the consistency provisions a1fects this last aspect of the Knecht
holding:
It is not the intent of the conferees that this subsection be construed to overturn, in whole
or in part, the judicial decision in American Petroleum Institute v. Knecht. Federal agencies
and applicants are assured that they will not be subjected to policies which are not enforceable under state law. However, this provision is not intended as a guarantee that the provisions of a coastal program will be so specific that users of the coastal zone must be able to
rely on its provisions as predictive devices for determining the fate of projects without interaction with the relevant state agencies. Individual projects must be reviewed on a casespecific basis and states may identify mitigation and other management measures which are
not specifically detailed in the management program but which, if implemented, would
allow the state to find projects consistent with the enforceable policies of the program.
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 964, JOist Cong., 2d Sess. 972, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2374, 2677.
138. 16 U.S.C.A. § 14SS(d)(l) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991).
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permitted activities described in detail in OCS plans "affecting any
land or water use or natural resource of the coastal zone"; and (5)
federal assistance to state and local governments "affecting any land or
water use or natural resource of the coastal zone!' 139
Every federal agency conducting or financially supporting 140 activities in or outside the zone affecting the coastal zone and every federal agency undertaking any development project 141 in a state coastal
zone must conduct the activities or project, "to the maximum extent
practicable," consistent with the "enforceable policies" 142 of the state
program. Federal agencies providing financial assistance to state and
local governments also must do so consistently with the enforceable
policies of approved state management programs. 143 Moreover, any
applicant for a required federal license or permit to conduct an activity
in or outside the zone affecting a state's coastal zone must "provide in
the application to the licensing or permitting agency a certification
that the proposed activity complies with the enforceable policies of the
state's approved program and that such activity will be conducted in a
manner consistent with the program." 144
The requirements for consistency review, as well as when those
requirements must be met, vary depending upon the type of federal
activity at issue and whether it must affect or be conducted in the
coastal zone.
In summary, consistency review is required for federal activities
affecting the coastal zone under section 1456(c)(l), for federal development projects in the coastal zone under section 1456(c)(2), for applications for federal licenses or permits affecting the coastal zone under
section 1456(c)(3)(A), for OCS post-lease sale activities affecting the
coastal zone under section 1456(c)(3)(B), and for federal funding for
state or local projects affecting the coastal zone under section 1456(d).
For federal licenses or permits, perhaps the most frequently occurring situation covered by the consistency provisions, the state or
designated agency must receive a copy of the certification with all nee139. /d. § 14S6(c), (d).
140. Id. § 14S6(cXI).
141. Id. § 14S6(cX2).
142. "Enforceable policy" is defined as "State policies which are legally binding through constitutional provisions, laws, regulations, land use plans, ordinances, or judicial or administrative decisions,
by which a State exerts control over private and public land and water uses and natural resources in the
coastal zone." /d. § 14S3(6a).
143. /d. § 14S6(d).
144. /d. § 14S6(c)(3)(A). Under the CZMA, the burden of establishing compliance with a state
program is on the federal agency proposing the contemplated action. Conservation Law Found. v.
Watt, S60 F. Supp. S61, S76 (D. Mass.), aff'd sub nom. Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir.
1983).
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essary information and data. 145 "At the earliest practicable time," the
state or designated agency must notify the federal agency concerned
that it concurs with or objects to the certification. 146 No federal license or permit can be granted without state concurrence, unless the
Secretary (on his own initiative or upon appeal by the applicant) finds,
after providing a reasonable opportunity for detailed comments from
the federal agency and state involved, that the activity is consistent
with the objectives of the Act or is otherwise necessary in the interest
of national security. 147

F. Offshore Leasing Under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act and the CZMA
The most controversial consistency determinations have involved
oil and gas lease activities in the outer continental shelf. Any plan for
the exploration, development, or production in any area leased under
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) 148 that affects any
land or water use or natural resource of a coastal zone must have attached a certification that each activity detailed in the plan complies
with the enforceable policies of a state's management program and
will be carried out consistently with that program. 149 No federal license or permit can be granted for any such activity until the state or
14!1. 16 U.S.C.A. § 14!16(c)(3)(A) (West 198!1 & Supp. 1991). Each coastal state must establish
procedures for public notice for such certification, and, to the extent it deems appropriate, procedures
for public hearings in connection therewith. /d.
146. /d. Failure of the state or designated agency to furnish this required notification within six
months of receipt of the certification is conclusively presumed as concurrence by the state with the
certification. /d.
147. /d.
148. 43 u.s.c. § 1331-13!16 (1988).
149. 16 U.S.C. § 14!16(c)(3)(B) (1988). There is also in the OCSLA a provision for an oil spill
liability fund to pay to remove any oil spilled as a result of OCS development and to pay for any
resulting damage. Administered by the Secretaries of the Treasury and Transportation, the Oft'shore
Oil Pollution Compensation Fund is financed through a surtax per barrel on oil produced in the OCS
and by fines, penalties, and reimbursement. Any United States resident, federal or state agency, or
political subdivision may recover for economic losses or environmental damages and for, among other
things, injuries to the use of property or natural resources including loss of profits. Owners and operatora of vessels and oft'shore facilities are essentially responsible in limited strict liability for oil spills. 43
U.S.C. §§ 1812-1814 (198!1). A district court refused to uphold the Secretary of the Interior's consistency certification for a lease sale despite similar aims and goals between state and federal regulatory
schemes and significant future state participation. Its determination that the OCS lease sale directly
aft'ected the coastal zone is questionable in light of Secretary of the Interior v. Colifornill. Conserv. Law
Found. v. Watt, !160 F. Supp. !161, 578 (D. Mass. 1983), aff'd sub nom., Committee of Mass. v. Watt,
716 F.2d 946 (lst Cir. 1983).
In response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill oft' Alaska in March 1989, Congress passed comprehensive oil spill legislation after fifteen years of unsuccessful attempts to pass such legislation. The Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 (Pub. L. No. 101-380) is discussed in [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA)
1264 (Nov. 2, 1990).
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designated agency receives the certification, the plan, and any other
necessary information and the state or designated agency concurs with
the certification and so notifies the Secretaries of Commerce and the
Interior. !so The state's concurrence is conclusively presumed if there
is no verification within six months of receipt of the certification.'''
The state may provide the Secretary, the appropriate federal agency,
and the applicant with a written statement on the status of review and
the basis for further delay. 1s2 If the state objects to the certification,
the Secretary may nevertheless find that the activity is consistent with
the objectives of the chapter or that it is otherwise necessary in the
interest of national security. 1sJ If a state objects and the Secretary fails
to make such a finding or if the applicant fails to comply with the plan
as submitted, the applicant must submit either an amended or a new
plan to the Secretary of the Interior. 1s4
It has been estimated that as much as 60% of this country's undiscovered oil and gas resources are in the outer continental shelf. m
During the Reagan administration, efforts were made to increase federal leasing in the continental shelf while seeking to eliminate funding
for many ocean and coastal programs. 1s6 It is perhaps for these reasons that most litigation and scholarly articles have focused on the
interrelationships between OCSLA leasing and the CZMA. 1s1
ISO. 16 U.S.C. § 14S6(c)(3)(B)(i) (1988).
lSI. /d. § 14S6(c)(3)(A).
152. /d. § 14S6(c)(3)(B)(ii).
153. Id. § 14S6(c)(3)(B)(iii).
I 54. For the amended or new plan, state concurrence will be conclusively presumed after 3
months. /d. § 14S6(c)(3)(B).
ISS. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ISSUES IN LEASING OFFSHORE LANES FOR OIL AND GAS
DEVELOPMENT EM0.81·S9, at I (1981).
156. See Dep't of Health & Human Services, Proposed S-Year OCS Oil and Gas Leasing Program, 46 Fed. Reg. 39,226 (1981); and Eliopoulos, Coastal Zone Management: Program at the Crossroads, 13 ENV'T REP. (BNA) Monograph No. 30 (September 17, 1982).
157. For more information on the conftict between the states and the federal government over
leasing in the coastal zone, see generally on the so-called "seaweed rebellion," Fitzgerald, Outer Continental Shelf Revenue Sharing: A Proposal to End the Seaweed Rebellion, S UCLA J. OF ENVTL. L. &
PoL'Y I (1985); Note, The Seaweed Rebellion: Federal-State Conflicts Over Offshore Oil and Gas Development, 18 WILLAMETTE L. REV. S3S (1982); Comment, The Seaweed Rebellion Revisited: Continuing
Federal-State Conflicts in OCS Oil and Gas Leasing, 20 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 83 (1984). See also
Deller, Federalism and Offshore Oil and Gas Leasing: Must Federal Tract Selections and Lease Stipulations Be Consistent with State Coastal Zone Management Programs? 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. lOS
(1980); Comment, Offshore Federalism: Evolving Federal-State Relations in Offshore Oil and Gas Development, II EcOLOGY L.Q. 401 (1984); Yi, Application of the Coastal Zone Management Act to Outer
Continental Shelf Lease Sales, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 159 (1982); Comment, Cooperative Federalism
for the Coastal Zone and the Outer Continental Shelf: A Legislative Proposal, 1983 BRIGHAM YOUNG U.
L. REV. 123; Note, Federal "Consistency" Under the Coastal Zone Management Act-A Promise Broken by Secretary of the Interior v. California, IS ENVTL. L. 153 (1984); Note, Outer Continental Shelf
Leasing Policy Prevails Over the California Coastal Commission, 24 NAT. RES. 1. 1133 (1984); Comment, Reappraisal of State's Interests in Outer Continental Shelf Lease Sales Under the Coastal Zone
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Under the Submerged Lands Act (SLA) passed in 1953, states
were granted quitclaim title to the lands three miles seaward of the
coastline. 1' 8 Under the OCSLA, the federal government has jurisdiction over the outer continental shelf beyond the three mile bound160
ary.1'9 As a result of domestic energy shortages in the early 1970's,
the OCS leasing program was pursued more aggressively. In 1978,
largely to expedite outer continental shelf development and to minimize state interference, 161 Congress passed amendments that divided
development into four stages: (1) development of a five year OCSLA
leasing program; (2) lease sales; (3)·exploration; and (4) development
and production. 162 To balance the need for energy against coastal
state interests, §§ 19 and 25 of the OCSLA established procedures for
coordination and consideration between the Department of the Interior and the governors of affected coastal states} 63 Section 19 was
designed to ensure that states would have an opportunity for input
into decisionmaking on proposed lease sales which would affect their
Management Act: Secretary of the Interior v. California, 29 WASH. U. J. URB. & CoNTEMP. LAW 277
(1985).
158. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1988). In 1845, the Supreme Court decision in Pollard's Lessee
v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845), indicated that the states' held title to the submerged lands of all
navigable waters including those in the coastal zone.
159. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-56, 1801-66 (1988). In 1947, the Supreme Court ruled in United States v.
California, 332 U.S. 19, 38-39 (1947), that the federal government had paramounfrights over the continental shelf. See also United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975) (the United States has sovereign
rights over the seabed and subsoil underlying the Atlantic Ocean lying more than three geographical
miles seaward from the ordinary low water mark and extending seaward to the outer edge of the Continental Shelf).
160. See generally, Special Message to the Congress on Energy Resources, 195 PUB. PAPERS 709
(June 4, 1971); Address to the Nation about Policies to Deal with the Energy Shortages, 323 PuB.
PAPERS 916 (Nov. 7, 1973); Special Message to the Congress on the Energy Crises, 17 PUB. PAPERS 29
(Jan. 23, 1974).
161. Jd.
162. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1344 (five year program), 1345 (lease sale), 1340 (exploration), 1351 (development and prediction) (1988). Only after the leases are awarded, do the lessees submit an exploratory
plan to the Department for approval, id. § 1340(cXl), followed by a production and development plan
prior to drilling. /d.§ 135l(aXl). Administration of the leasing is done by the Bureau of Land Management. The Bureau initially selects and schedules for leasing areas of the outer continental shelf.
Data on oil and gas reserves are then compiled. A call for bids is published in the Federal Register.
After reviewing bids, the Bureau selects individual tracts for leasing and prepares draft and then final
environmental impact statements. See Note, The Seaweed Rebellion: FetJ.erai-Stat~ Conflicts Over Offshore Oil and Gas Development, supra note 157, at 538-39. Governors of affected coastal states may
submit comments on the size, timing, and location of a proposed lease sale. 43 U.S.C. § 1345 (1988).
The Secretary of the Interior may accept such recommendations if they "provide for a reasonable balance between the national interest and the well-being of the citizens of the affected State." Jd. § 134S(c).
Final notice of the sale is published in the Federal Register. Purchase of a lease gives the purchaser a
right to conduct "preliminary activities" on the leased tract. Before actual exploration, plans must be
submitted to and approved by the Secretary. Subsequently, another plan for development must also be
submitted for approval and is subject to comments by the governors of affected states. When approved,
only then can <!evelopment and production commence. /d. §§ 1345(a) - (c), 1351.
163. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1345(a) - (c), 1351 (1988).
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coastal areas. 164 In 1976, Congress amended the CZMA to address its
interrelationship with the OCSLA. 165 Also in 1976, Congress established the Coastal Energy Impact Program (CEIP) to provide funds to
coastal states to compensate for their costs of coastal energy development. 166 Secretarial mediation was provided for state and federal disagreement over consistency of a lease plan. 167
Most litigation has focused on § 18 of the OCSLA 168 governing
the five year leasing program 169 and on the Secretary of the Interior's
interpretation of "directly affecting" in § 307(c)(1) 170 of the CZMA
before the 1990 amendments. 171 These provisions reveal the uneasy
balance of federal and state power in the CZMA. In offshore energy
development, the national interest in energy production frequently
conflicts with states' environmental concerns. So far, states have been
the losers in the battle.
1. Challenges to Formulation of a Five-Year Leasing Plan
Under Section 18 of the OCSLA
The Secretary of the Interior is required under § 18 of the OCSLA to develop a five year leasing program to set the size, timing, and
location of leasing activities to meet energy needs by considering a
variety of factors 172 and balancing energy potential, environrpental ef164. H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 152-53, reprinted in U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 1450, 1457-58.

165. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(cX3)(B) (1988).
166. /d. § 1456a. The program was eliminated in the 1990 amendments. See II(G), infra.
167. IS C.P.R. § 930.85 (1990).
168. 43
§ 1344 (1988).
169. See, e.g., California v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1981), appeal after remand, 712 F.2d
584 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
.
§ 1456(cXI) (1988).
170. 16
171. See, e.g., Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464" U.S. 312 (1984).
172. Under section 18(aX2), there must be consideration of:
(A) existing information concerning the geographical, geological, and ecological characteristics of such regions;
(B) an equitable sharing of developmental benefits and environmental risks among the various regions;
(C) the location of such regions with respect to, and the relative needs of, regional and
national energy markets;
(D) the location of such regions with respect to other uses of the sea and seabed, including
fisheries, navigation, existing or proposed sealanes, potential sites of deepwater ports, and
other anticipated uses of the resources and space of the outer Continental Shelf;
(E) the interest of potential oil and gas producers in the development of oil and gas resources as indicated by exploration or nomination;
(F) laws, goals, and policies of alfected States which have been specifically identified by the
Governors of such States as relevant matters for the Secretary's consideration;
(G) the relative environmental sensitivity and marine productivity of dilferent areas of the
outer Continental Shelf; and
(H) relevant environmental and predictive information for dill'erent areas of the outer Continental Shelf.

u.s.c.

u.s.c.
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fects, and adverse impacts on the coastal zone. 173 The first five year
plan was approved by the Secretary of the Interior in June, 1980. 174 In
the following month the plan was challenged in court by Alaska, California, the North Slope ·Borough of Alaska, and the National Resources Defense Council on the grounds that § 18 had been
violated. 175 The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held
that factual conclusions under the OCSLA would be upheld· if supported by substantial evidence, policy decisions would be upheld if not
arbitrary and capricious, and that questions of law would be reviewed
de novo by the court. 176 The court held that the Secretary of the Interior: (1) had not defined lease sales in the program "as precisely as
possible"; 177 (2) had not considered the equitable sharing of development benefits and environment risks among regions as required by
§ 18(a)(2)(B); 178 (3) did not consider the relative environmental sensitivity and marine productivity of different areas as required by
§ 18(a)(2)(G); 179 and (4) had not properly balanced the potential for
energy discovery, environmental damage, and adverse coastal zone impacts in selecting the timing or location of lease sales as required by
§ 18(a)(3) due to his failure to consider adequately the § 18(a)(2)
factors. 180
In July 1981, Secretary of Interior James Watt submitted to Congress a new five year leasing program. 181 In October 1981, the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the prior program back to the Department of the Interior with a schedule for compliance with its opinion.182 Accordingly, Watt's own program with an area to be leased 25
43 U.S.C. § 1344(aX2)(A)-(H) (1988).
173. Id. § 1344(aX3).
174. California v. Watt (Watt 1), 668 F.2d 1290, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
17S. Id. at 1290.
176. Id. at 1301-1303.
177. Id. at 1303-1304. Section 17 requires the Secretary in the leasing schedule to demonstrate
"as precisely as possible, the size, timing, and location of leasing activity which he determines will best
meet national energy needs for the five-year period following its approval or reapproval." 43 U.S.C.
§ 1344(a) (1988).
178. 668 F.2d at 1304-1308. The court stated environmental risks were not solely dependent
upon the likelihood of an oil spill, but were dependent on both the probability and amount of damage.
ld. at 1308.
179. 668 F.2d at 1311-1313. The Secretary had argued it would be impossible to do meaningful
area comparisons as required. Id. at 1312. The Court held that speculative information might be
utilized to make a good faith eft'ort toward compliance. Id. at 1313.
180. ld. at 1318. Section 18(aX3) requires that the Secretary select the "timing and location of
leasing, to the maximum extent practicable, so as to obtain a proper balance between the potential for
environmental damage, the potential for the discovery of oil and gas, and the potential for adverse
impact on the coastal zone." 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(3) (1988),
181. 46 Fed. Reg. 39,226 (1981).
182. 668 F.2d 1290.
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times greater than the area leased throughout the entire history of the
OCSLA program was revised and approved by Watt in July 1982.1 83
Alaska, California, Florida, Oregon, and Washington brought suit to
challenge the program's validity,l 84 claiming that§ 18 of the OCSLA,
as well as the 1981 Watt I decision, had 'bdm violated. Although
claiming to utilize the standards of review set out in Watt I, the Court
in Watt II characterized many of the issues as focusing on the inadequacy of the Secretary's analysis, which could only be s~t aside as arbitrary and capriCious. Thus, despite similarities to several of the claims
upheld in Watt I, the Court held that Watt had complied with§ 18 of
the OCSLA. 185
Thus far, the only limitations on the five year leasing programs
have been imposed by Congress. In·1983, President Reagan.signed a
Department of the Interior appropriations bill with a moratorium on
certain leases through the fiscal year of 1984. 186 The moratorium was
continued through fiscal year 1985. 187 Under Public Law Number 99190, passed in 1985, the moratorium was again continued for areas in
the North Atlantic, but the Department of the Interior and California
were to negotiate a suitable agreement on moratoriums for lease areas
off the coast of California. 188 On June 26, 1990, President Bush cancelled five proposed oil and gas lease sales which included three sales
off the coast of California, one off the Florida coast, and one in the
North Atlantic, making most of the tracts unavailable for leasing consideration until after the year 2000. Eighty-seven tracts within the
Santa Maria Basin and Santa Barbara channel would be available for
leasing consideration after January 1, 1996, if studies demonstrate that
drilling is environmentally sound. 189
183. STAFF OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVBSTJGATIONS OF THE HOUSE CoMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 98TH CoNG., 1ST SBSS., SECRETARY OF INTERIOR
JAMBS G. WATT'S FIVE YEAR OIL AND GAS LEASING PLAN FOR THE OUTER CoNTINENTAL SHELF 6
(Comm. Print No.4, 1983).
184. California v. Watt (Watt II), 712 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1983). A companion suit was also
brought by seven environmental groups. /d. at 590. The plaintiff's claimed that the Secretary had: (I)
failed to indicate the "size, timing, and location of leasing activity as precisely as possible"; (2) failed to
choose his program on § 18(a)(2) factors; (3) violated § 18(a)(3) by arbitrary assumptions and erroneous procedures; (4) failed to assure the receipt of fair market value under§ 18(a)(4); (5) failed to consider environmental impacts of the program under §§ 18(a)(l)-(3) and the National Environmental
Policy Act; and (6) violated § 18(1) by failing to specify when a consistency determination had to be
done. Fitzgerald, supra note 157, at 11 n. 73.
185. 712 F.2d at 590.
186. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98146, §§ 108-109, 97 Stat. 919, 934-37 (1983).
187. Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 108, 98 Stat. 1837, 1853-55 (1984).
188. Act of Dec. 9, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-190, §§ 107, 149, 99 Stat. 1185, 1241-43, 1325-26
(1985); [Current Developments] 16 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1661-1662 (December 27, 1985).
189. [CUrrent Developments] 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 413 (Jun. 29, 1990).
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The conflict between state control and federal power shows no
signs of abating. The new five year leasing plan proposed for 1987 to
1992 met with immediate opposition from congressional representatives for coastal states. 190 One bill was introduced to repeal legislatively · the Supreme Court's decision in Secretary of the Interior v.
California 191 restricting consistency review and to give the Environmental Protection Agency, rather than the Department of Interior, the
authority to set air pollution standards for offshore drilling rigs. 192
Also, a NOAA preliminary issue paper, written in response to the
reauthorization of the CZMA in April of 1986, was attacked vigorously by state regulators and environmentalists, who claimed it would
intrude even further into state control of coastal areas. 193
2. Sections 307(c)(l) and 307(c)(3)(B) of the CZMA and
Consistency Review for OCSLA Lease Sales
Prior to the 1990 amendments, section 307(c)(1) of the CZMA
required that federal activity "directly affecting" a state's coastal zone
be done "in a manner which is, to the maximum extent practicable,
consistent with approved state management programs." 194 In July,
1980, the California Coastal Commission asked the Department of the
Interior to submit a consistency determination at the time the Department published its proposed Notice of Sale for Lease oft' the coast of
California. 195 The Department of the Interior refused to submit a consistency determination because of its view that the proposed notice of
sale did not "directly affect" the coastal zone and thus did not require
a consistency determination under § 307(c)(1). 196 Both the. district
court 197 and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 198 rejected the Department's position that activities "directly affecting" the coastal zone
190. [Current Developments]18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 239 (May 8, 1987).
191. 464 u.s. 312 (1984).
192. H.R. 1876, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1987). See also [Current Developments], supra note 190, at
240. Frequently, even if ofFshore drilling rigs are found to be consistent with an applicable state program, control of air pollution requirements administered by the EPA may still prevent construction and
operation of the rig. Hearing, supra note 1, at 63.
193. [Current Developments] 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1149 (Nov. 7, 1986).
194. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1) (1988).
195. California v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253, 1258-1259 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom., Secretary of
the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984).
196. For a detailed analysis of the positions of California and the Department of the Interior, see
Linsley, Federal Consistency and Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing: The Application of the
"Directly Affecting" Test to Pre-Lease Sale Activities, 9 B. C. ENvn. AFF. L. REv. 431 (1980).
197. California v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982),
rev'd sub nom. Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984).
198. California v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom, Secretary. of the Interior v.
California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984).
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were only those activities that physically affected the coastal zones so
that consistency review was limited to activities during the actual exploration, development, and production stages.
The Supreme Court in Secretary of the Interior v. California, 199
however, upheld the Department's position in a closely decided opinion on slightly different grounds than those argued by the Department.
Justice O'Connor focused on the remaining lease sale in controversylease sale 53, which included the Santa Maria Basin, an important
habitat of the sea otter. 200 In holding that only federal activities within
the coastal zone could directly affect the coastal zone, the court relied
on the legislative history of the CZMA. Congress's rejection of four
proposals to extend the CZMA beyond three miles 201 and of a specific
proposal to make OCSLA leasing subject to consistency review
demonstrated to the Court a congressional intent to exclude OCSLA
leasing from review. 202 In addition, the separation of OCSLA development into four stages was interpreted as a congressional decision to
separate OCSLA lease sales from the later two stages of development
for purposes of consistency review under§ 307(c)(3)(B). 203 According
to Justice O'Connor, the purchase of an OCS lease entailed no right to
explore for, develop, or produce oil or gas resources that would trigger
§ 307(c)(3)(B) consistency review. Section 307(c)(l) consistency review was not triggered because the phrase "directly affecting" was
"aimed at including activities conducted or supported by federal agencies on federal lands physically situated in the coastal zone but excluded from the zone" 204 as defined in the CZMA. Even if OCS lease
sales were an activity conducted or supported by a federal agency
under§ 301(c)(l), lease sales would have no direct effect on the coastal
zone because they authorized only very limited "preliminary activities" on the OCS. 205
In a strong dissent by Justice Stevens, California's arguments
before the Court were generally accepted. Justice Stevens found that
the language and legislative history of the CZMA, as well as its purpose, did not support the majority's position. 206 He pointed out the
savings clause in OCSLA, which specifically states that nothing in that
Act is to be construed to interfere with the consistency procedure re199. 464 U.S. 312 (1984). The decision, written by Justice O'Connor, was decided by a 5·4 vote.

/d.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.

at 318.
at 324-30.

at 330.
at 342.
at 345 (Stevens, J ., dissenting).
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quirements of the CZMA. 207 The express goal of the CZMA is to
encourage coordination between states and federal agencies, a goal defeated by the majority's holding. 208 According to the dissent, nothing
in the language of the Act distinguished between in-zone and out-ofzone activities in determining whether there was a direct effect on the
coastal zone under § 307(c)(l).209 If anything, the term "directly affecting" the coastal zone was intended to include within consistency
review those-activities which, in part, do not occur in coastal zones. 210
There are three possible grounds for the majority decision. The
first and broadest is that oil and gas leases are not subject to consistency review under § 307(c)(l) because they are activities outside the
coastal zone. · Second, the Court may have simply found that lease
sales were specifically excluded by Congress from consistency review
under § 307(c)(3)(B). Third, the Court may have held that even if
lease sales are covered by § 307(c)(l), they do not directly affect the
coastal zone. It is the first and broadest interpretation that is the most
troublesome-that federal activities under § 307(c)(l) must be conducted within the coastal zone to directly affect it and thus be subject
to consistency review.
The opinion has been intensely criticized. 211 In addition to the
criticisms suggested in the dissent, it has been pointed out that the
CZMA was enacted largely in response to the 1969 oil well blow-out
and extensive damage in the Santa Barbara Channel on OCS lands
outside of the California coastal zone. 212 Also, in suggesting that the
1978 amendments to the OCSLA repealed any express or implied previous requirement of consistency review, Justice O'Connor essentially
ignored the 1978 amendment which included a savings clause expressly preserving the provisions of the 1972 CZMA. 213
The majority's interpretation of § 307(c)(1) consistency review
can be criticized as well from a policy perspective. Meaningful environmental decisionmaking can only be made at the point in decisionmaking when environmental values are not yet clearly outweighed by
investment costs already expended toward a project. Although OCS
lease sales only entitle lessees to priority in submission of development
plans, this commitment entails significant expenditures and adminis207. /d. at 371 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208. /d. at 345-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
209. /d. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210. /d. at 355-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
211. See generally the articles in note 157 supra.
212. Grosso, supra note 8, at 272.
213. "Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be
construed to amend, modify, or repeal any provision of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972
.... " 43 U.S.C. § 1866(a) (1985).
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trative action. 214 The further along in the process that consistency review is required, the less likely it is that a lessee will have to do
anything more than file the necessary paperwork.
The second policy based criticism that can be leveled is a more
general one regarding the very nature of environmental decisionmaking. The Supreme Court's decision in Secretary of the Interior v. California is consistent with the Court's recent propensity toward
segmentation of consideration of environmental impacts/ 15 combined
with an unwillingness to impose additional procedures to ensure
meaningful consideration. 216 Unfortunately, the environment is not as
easily segmented. What occurs one mile within a coastal zone or one
mile outside of it is a distinction without a difference. In collectively
shared environments--air, water, and ocean-all relevant environmental impacts must be considered, regardless of the location of their
source. 217 The CZMA was a significant step toward a realistic, encompassing view of environmental protection, a step forward from
which the Supreme Court retreated. 218
In the 1990 amendments to the CZMA, section 307(c)(l) was
amended to read in its entirety as follows:
(c)(l)(A) Each Federal agency activity within or outside the
coastal zone that affeets any land or water use or natural resource
of the coastal zone shall be carried out in a manner which is consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the enforceable
policies of approved State management programs. A Federal
agency activity shall be subject to this paragraph unless it is subject
to paragraph (2) or (3).
(B) After any final judgment, decree, or order of any Federal
court tJtat is appealable under section 1291 or 1292 of title 28,
214. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the Secretary may not terminate
a lease at will without compensating the lessee for substantial investments. Union Oil Co. of California
v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975).
215. See, e.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
216. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
u.s. 519 (1978).
217. The environmental impacts include the possibility of an oil spill, air pollution from hydrocarbon emissions from the loading of oil onto barges or tankers, aesthetic harm, noise pollution, and
increased population and traffic in the fragile coastal area. Economic repercussions for the coastal state
include major onshore development such as pipeline landfalls, harbor supply bases, refineries and deepwater ports, harm to tourism, increased population in the coastal area, and increased local governmental costs. See Grosso, supro note 8, at 274.
218. For further criticism of California v. Watt and legislative responses to the decision, see Casenote, Secretary of Interior v. California: Its Direct Effects on the Coastal Zone Management Act, 8
GI!ORGE MASON U.L. REv. 197 (1985). Many scholarly articles focusing on the CZMA have been
addressed to the interpretation of "directly affecting" in § 307(cXI). See, e.g., (in addition to the articles previously cited in note 157, supro), O'Connor, Clark v. California: A New ApproVGI to Federol
Consistency and the Outer Continental Shelf Lease Sale Process, 3 COOLEY L. REv. 473 (1985).
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United States Code, or under any other applicable provision of
Federal law, that a specific Federal agency activity is not in compliance with subparagraph (A), and certification by the Secretary
that mediation under subsection (b) is not likely to result in such
compliance, the President may, upon written request from the Secretary, exempt from compliance those elements of the Federal
agency activity that are found by the Federal court to be inconsistent with an approved State program, if the President determines
that the activity is in the paramount interest of the United States.
No such exemption shall be granted on the basis of a lack of appropriations unless the President has specifically requested such appropriations as part of the 'budgetary process, and the Congress
has failed to make available the requested appropriations.
(C) Each Federal Agency carrying out an activity subject to
paragraph (1) shall provide a consistency determination to the relevant State agency designated under section 1455(d)(6) of this title
at the earliest practicable time, but in no case later than 90 days
before final approval of the Federal activity unless both the Federal agency and the State agency agree to a different schedule. 219

The first subsection of this provision overturns Secretary of the Interior
v. California by subjecting OCSLA oil and gas lease sales to the consistency requirements of section 307(c)(l). The second subsection is new
and authorizes a Presidential exemption if the activity is in the paramount interest of the United States, a standard exemption provided in
a number of other environmental statutes. Technical changes in the
other consistency provisions of sections 307(c)(3)(A) and 307(d) coupled with the new section 307(c)(l) make it clear that any federal
agency activity that affects any natural resources, land uses, or water
uses in the coastal zone are subject to consistency review regardless of
whether the activity is in or outside the coastal zone. 220 The House
conference report states that, in evaluating whether or not the federal
agency activity may affect the coastal zone, consideration must be
given to effects that the federal agency:
may reasonably anticipate as a result of its action, including cumulative and secondary effects. Therefore, the term "affecting" is to
be construed broadly, including direct effects which are caused by
the activity and occur at the same time and place, and indirect
effects which may be caused by the activity and are later in time or
farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable. 221
219. Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-S08, 104 Stat.
1388, 1388-307 § 6208 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(cX1) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991)).
220. /d.
221. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 964, IOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 970-71, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CoDE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 2374, 2675-76. ·
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There have been recurring suggestions for reform of coastal zone
management, mostly focusing on consistency review of OCSLA leasing. One such proposal is revenue sharing of OCSLA leasing revenues
with states. 222 Although this proposal perhaps would soften coastal
states' antagonism to offshore leasing, it would at best counterbalance
cuts in federal funding for the CZMA grants and at worst undermine
the objectives of environmental protection in the CZMA. 223 Another
suggestion is the use of a less biased mediation panel in place of the
Secretary of Commerce to mediate disputes between the federal and
state governments. An ad hoc panel would be formed of one representative each from the state coastal agency, the governor's office, the
Departments of the Interior and Commerce, and the petroleum industry.224 But not only would state representatives still be a minority, the
new panel would do nothing to revise the reviewability or grounds for
review of federal activities. Numerous proposals have also been made
to amend the CZMA, frequently to overrule the Supreme Court's decision in Secretary of the Interior v. California, 225 as was done in the
1990 amendments. Yet all these measures are piecemeal attempts to
give the CZMA, particularly in its relationship to the OCSLA, the
strength originally envisioned for the Act in 1972. That strength was
illusory from the beginning. States were given virtually unlimited discretion in the designation of coastal areas deserving of protection and
were left to their own devices in specifying permissible land and water
uses so long as the lofty but general objectives of the Act were satisfied. Only in 1980 was the Secretary even authorized to withhold
funding from coastal states for failing to satisfy the Act's requirements. 226 Consistency review for offshore leasing suffers from a similar lack of guidance for the respective priorities to be given to energy
development and to environmental preservation. As formulated, this
222. Comment, Cooperative Federalism for the Coastal Zone and the Outer Continental Shelf: A
Legislative Proposal, 1983 B.Y.U. L. REv. 123 (1983); Fitzgerald, Outer Continental Shelf Revenue
Sharing: A Proposal to End the Seaweed Rebellion, S UCLA J. ENvn.. L. & PoL'Y 1 (198S).
223. Grosso, supra note 8, at 283.
224. Note, Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Policy Prevails Over the California Coastal Commission, 24 NAT. REsoURCES J. 1133 (1984).
22S. See, e.g., S. 2384, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); H.R. 4S89, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984);
[Current Developments] Env't Rep. (DNA) 734 (July 3, 1987). One frequent criticism of current
coastal zone management is of the lack of funding for scientific research. The National Ocean Pollution
Planning Act of 1978, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1709 (1988), provides for the establishment of a comprehensive plan for the overall federal effort in ocean pollution research and development and monitoring,
with the NOAA as the lead federal agency. The Secretary of Commerce is authorized to make grants
to coastal states to acquire lands and waten as necessary to ensure the long term management of an
area as a national estuarine reserve, to conduct educational activities, or to support research and monitoring within a national estuarine reserve. 16 U.S. C. § 1461 ( 1988).
226. 16 U.S.C. § 14S8 (1988).
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necessary but difficult evaluation is avoided by a process that invites
federal-state conflicts. With any environmentally controversial offshore leasing, the state will understandably be inclined to utilize its
role in the consistency review process to elevate its own management
program and localized environmental concerns over national energy
needs. Similarly, by the time a private applicant pursues an OCS
lease, the federal administration is substantially committed to such development through the Secretary of the Interior's designation of the
area for offshore leasing as part and parcel of a national energy policy.
The consistency process intensifies the adversarial positions of the involved state and federal agencies with no substantive criteria for resolution of the conflict. Indeed, the Secretary of Commerce, who serves
as the ultimate arbitrator in cases .of conflict, is only authorized to
approve leasing that is consistent with the state program or necessary
to national security. 227 It is not surprising, therefore, that the Secretary's mediation is rarely utilized, as the difficult conflicts involve leasing that is ostensibly inconsistent with the state program and not
necessary to national security, but that is, nevertheless, a potentially
important source of energy resources.
G. The Coastal Energy Impact Program

Prior to 1990, states with approved coastal programs could receive financial assistance to fund public facilities and services and to
remedy environmental consequences of energy development in the
coastal zone. Under the Coastal Energy Impact Program as it was set
out in section 308 of the CZMA, grants, loans, loan guarantees, and
other financial assistance were to be provided to states to implement
its provisions. 228 The program was created in 1976 to ameliorate the
effects of energy development on the coastal states and, in part, to
obviate state delay of federal OCS leasing plans. 229
In October of 1990, when the lOlst Congress passed the Coastal
Zone Management Reauthorization· Act amendments as part of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990,230 one major change was
the elimination of the Coastal Energy Impact Program231 which was
replaced by a newly created, much more limited Coastal Zone Man227. Id § 1456.
228. See 16 U.S.C. § 1456 (1988).
229. H.R. REP. No. 1298, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
ADMIN. NEWS 1820, 1820.21.
230. Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990).
231. 16 u.s.c. § 1456 (1988).
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agement Fund. 232
The Fund will consist of amounts received from the repayment of
loans made to state and local governments under section 308(a) of the
CZMA. 233 These funds may then be used, at the discretion of the
Secretary, to cover administrative expenses created by the Act in
amounts up to specified limits for fiscal years 1991 through 1995. 234
Following such allocation, funds may be used for:
a) projects addressing regional and inter-state coastal zone
management issues, 235
b) demonstration projects, particularly local level projects,
having a high potential for improving coastal zone
management, 236
c) emergency grants to enable state coastal zone management
agencies to respond to unforeseen or disaster-related
circumstances, 237
d) awards to recognize excellence in coastal zone management under section 314, 238
e) program development grants pursuant to section 305 239
and,
f) financial support to coastal states for use in implementing
state coastal zone management programs which are approved under section 306 and which have investigated and
applied the public trust doctrine in such implementation.240
Finally, the Secretary is required to provide Congress with an annual
report detailing the balance of the Fund and an itemization of receipts
and expenses on December 1 of each year. 241
III. COASTAL REGULATION AND THE TAKING ISSUE

When a state regulates to protect its coastal zone, the protective
regulation is almost inevitably a restriction on growth and development. After the 1978 Supreme Court decision in Penn Central Trans232. Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat.
1388, 1388-308 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991)).
233. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456a(b)(l) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991).
234. /d. § 1456a(b)(2)(A).
235. /d. § 1456a(b)(2)(B)(i).
236. /d. § 1456a(b)(2)(B)(ii).
237. /d. § 1456a(b)(2)(B)(iii).
238. /d. § 1456a(b)(2)(B)(iv).
239. /d. § 1456a(b)(2)(B)(v).
240. /d. § 1456a(b)(2)(B)(vi).
241. /d. § 1456a(b)(3).
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port. Co. v. New York City, 242 the legal possibility that a regulatory
interference with private property could be an unconstitutional "taking" raised the spectre of litigation over coastal zone regulation. The
disincentive to such litigation, however, was developed in a series of
taking cases following Penn Central. 243 According to these cases, the
factors to be taken into consideration when determining if a regulation
works a taking are "the character of the governmental action, its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable investment backed
expectations." 244 Perhaps more importantly, the opinion in Penn Central suggested that for a taking to occur, the regulation must deprive a
landowner of all or almost all reasonable economic return on the
property. 24s
In 1987, however, the Supreme Court markedly deviated from its
established approach to the taking clause, casting a pall over innovative, and some traditional, fonns of land use regulation. The three
cases, Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 246 First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 241 and Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 248 clearly signified a shift in the Court's
interpretation of what constitutes a "regulatory taking."
Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Central, and the approach generally
taken in the cases which followed, was to first determine which of the
so-called "bundle of sticks" constituting property had been taken (for
example, the right to exclude others) and then to determine how important that "stick" is to the use or economic value of the property. If
that property right is of an as yet unspecified level of significance to
the economic value or use of the property, then its deprivation alone
may constitute a taking.
In sum, the nature of the property right taken becomes more important than what property rights remain. Thus, deprivation of a single property right, the right to exclude others, may be a taking without
regard to the economic value of any remaining rights in the property. 249 As such, it becomes more and more difficult to regulate
coastal property, due to the fear of the regulation being classified as a
"taking."
242.
243.
244.
Center v.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

438 u.s. 104 (1978).
See discussion infra.
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 46 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984) (quoting Pruneyard Shopping
Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980)).
438 U.S. at 149 n.l3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion).
480 u.s. 470 (1987).
482 u.s. 304 (1987).
483 u.s. 825 (1987).
See text accompanying notes 361-362 infra.
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Implicit in the concept of land use regulation is the premise that
property rights are not absolute. Of all the so-called property rights, a
right to develop one's property is the most likely source of conflict
and, concomitantly, the right most likely to necessitate compromise.
It is no longer reasonable to expect one's property rights to extend
"from the center usque ad coelum. " 250 A theory of taking jurisprudence that reinstates the right to .develop as fundamental or paramount fails to reflect the modem realities of land use regulation or the
expectations of the property owner. Yet it is precisely this theory the
Court embraced in a series of taking cases in the term. 251
The 1987 harbinger of the new taking approach, although ostensibly rejecting it, was Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis.252 In Keystone, a coal association, whose members owned
substantial coal reserves under legislatively protected property, challenged Pennsylvania's Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act (Land Act) which prohibited coal mining that causes
subsidence damage to pre-existing public buildings, dwellings, and
cemeteries. 253 The plaintiff filed suit alleging that Pennsylvania law
recognized a separate "support estate" in land and that the Land Act
was a regulatory taking of that interest in violation of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. 254 Because no injury to specific pieces of
property was alleged, the only challenge to the Land Act was a facial
challenge. 255 Yet the case squarely presented the difficulty of defining
the unit of property allegedly "taken" by the regulation.
In rejecting the taking claim, the district court had distinguished
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon on the grounds that the Land Act served
valid public purposes not present in Pennsylvania Coal. 256 On the taking issue itself, the district court found no taking because the destruction of the support estate was a strand in a "bundle" of property
rights, some of which were not affected by the Land Act. 257 The court
of appeals affirmed, but with a different analysis. The court of appeals
also found that the Land Act served legitimate purposes. 258 However,
the court did not rely on the support estate being a separate and distinct strand in a bundle of rights, but rather "considered the support
estate as just one segment of a larger bundle of rights that invariably
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Hay v. Cahoes Co., 2 N.Y. 159 (1849).
See text accompanying notes 318-319, infra.
480 u.s. 470 (1987).
/d. at 476.
/d. at 478.
/d. at 493.
/d. at 479.
/d.
/d. at 480.
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includes either the surface estate or the mineral estate." 2 ' 9 Thus, the
district court evaluated the support estate as one strand in a bundle of
property rights, and the Court of Appeals viewed it as inseparable
from the surface estate or the mineral estate. In both lower courts, by
following the Penn Central majority opinion, there was no taking by
virtue of the definition of the property unit taken. If either court had
accepted Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Central, the taking of one distinct property right, the support estate, would have been a regulatory
taking. The Supreme Court, therefore, was squarely presented with a
case in which the definition of the unit of property affected would be
outcome determinative of whether there was a taking.
Not surprisingly then, Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion
joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, with a
dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Powell,
O'Connor, and Scalia. 260 Justice Stevens first had to address the similarity of Keystone to Pennsylvania Coa/, 261 in which Justice Holmes in
a very similar case had found a taking. Citing the Pennsylvania legislative determination that the Land Act was necessary to protect the
public interest in "safety, land conservation, preservation of affected
municipalities tax bases, and land development," the majority found
that the "environmental concern" of the Land Act went far beyond
the purpose of the Kohler Act which was enacted merely to protect
individual private property. 262 Acknowledging both the district
court's and court of appeal's opinions, the Court stated that the portion of Pennsylvania Coal addressed to the general validity of the
Kohler Act was an "advisory opinion" not required by the issues in
the case. 263 Relying on Penn Central, the Court stated that land regulation can effectuate a taking if it " 'does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests . . . or denies an owner economically viable
use of his land.' " 264 As for the public purpose of the Land Act, the
Court reiterated that the Land Act was to serve the public interest, not
private interests, because, unlike the Kohler Act, the Land Act had no
exception from its prohibition when the surface estate was owned by
the owner of the support estate. 26'
Although Justice Stevens suggested that the Land Act might fall
within the nuisance exception for a taking under the police power, he
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
26S.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

472.
481.
48S.
484.
48S.
486.
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went on to analyze whether the diminution in value was sufficient to
constitute a taking. The Court seemed to carve out a potential exception to the taking clause for legislation to protect the public from a
nuisance. Quoting Mugler v. Kansas, 266 in which a Kansas constitutional amendment that prohibited the sale and manufacture of intoxicating liquors was challenged, the Court stated, " 'prohibition simply
upon the use of property for purposes that are declared by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or appropriation of
property... .' " 267 Nevertheless, the Court declined to rest its decision
on that factor alone and turned to the Land Act's diminution of property value and investment-backed expectations.
On the taking issue specifically, Pennsylvania law is unique in
that it recognizes three separate estates in land: the mineral estate, the
surface estate, and the support estate. 268 In Pennsylvania Coal, the
Court had found that the Kohler Act had made mining of certain coal
commercially impracticable. 269 Emphasizing that the case presently
before it was afacial challenge to the Land Act, the Court emphasized
that it was not presented with particular surface mining operations or
their effect on specific parcels of land. 270 Noting that the plaintiff had
not argued that' the Land Act itself made mining commercially impractical, the Court pointed out that instead the plaintiff had sought to
define narrowly the unit of property allegedly taken by focusing on
specific tons of coal and, alternatively, the separate support estate. 271
Quoting from Penn Central that effects on the parcel of property
as a whole must be considered, 272 the Court rejected the plaintiff's
arguments. The Court found that the 27 million tons of coal that
could not be mined were not a "separate segment ofproperty."273 The
Court emphasized that otherwise a simple set back requirement for a
building on a lot could be characterized as a taking. 274 More troublesome, however, was whether the support estate recognized by Pennsylvania law was a property unit taken by the Land Act. The Court
said that just as the air rights above Grand Central were a strand in a
bundle of property rights, the support estate here considered was also
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

123 u.s. 623 (1887).
480 U.S. at 489.
/d. at 500.
/d. at 493.
/d. at 496.
/d. at 496.
/d. at 497.
/d. at 498.
/d.
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only one strand. 275 The court of appeals under Pennsylvania law had
recognized as a practical matter that the support estate is always
owned by either the surface estate owner or the mineral estate
owner. 276 Because the support estate could not be used without either
the mineral estate or the surface estate, the Court held that the support estate was "merely a part of the entire bundle of rights possessed
by the owner of either the coal or the surface. " 277
If the majority had stopped at that point, Keystone would have
been a clear refutation of Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Central.
The Court, however, qualified its definition of the property unit with
an alternative holding. Even if the support estate were a distinct segment of property for taking purposes, the Court stated, there would
still not be a taking. The record, according to Justice Stevens, was
devoid of any evidence of what percentage of the support estates,
either in the aggregate or with respect to any individual estate, had
.been affected by the Land Act. 278
In an opinion echoing his disagreement in Penn Central, Chief
Justice Rehnquist dissented, finding Pennsylvania Coal to be dispositive.279 In the process, however, the dissent emphasized that a public
purpose is necessary to the government's exercise of its police power,
but does not itself have any bearing on whether a regulation goes so
far as to be a taking. 280 Apparently contradicting his position in Penn
Central, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected a broad nuisance exception
to the taking clause, while accentuating that federal law, rather than
state law, determines the legitimacy of the state's purpose. 281 In keeping with his Penn Central dissent, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist
rejected the majority's definition of the property unit. It was the
smallest possible segment of property in the case, the 27 million tons
of coal affected, that the dissent recognized as the property unit, a
"property" that could not be removed under the Land Act and thus
was destroyed. 282 The dissent stated that definition of the unit of
property must be determined by state law. 283 Quoting the same language in Penn Central quoted above by the majority, the dissent again
emphasized in a footnote that the Court in Penn Central gave no guidance on how to define the property unit for purposes of taking
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

283.

ld.
ld.
Jd.
ld.
/d.
/d.
/d.
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S12
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S18
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(Rehnquist,
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jurisprudence. 284
Although Keystone is ostensibly a victory of the majority decision
in Penn Central, that victory is qualified by the alternative holdings of
the majority opinion in Keystone, and by the fact that in his dissent,
Chief Justice Rehnquist gained the support of Justices Powell,
O'Connor, and Scalia as adherents to his views in place of former
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens. 28s
It is far from clear how Justice Stevens defined the "property"
allegedly taken by the Pennsylvania statute in Keystone. It is clear
that he rejects the 27 million tons of coal as constituting a separate
segment of property for purposes of the takings clause and in doing so
rejects Pennsylvania property law as determinative of the issue. At
one point Justice Stevens concludes that as a practical matter the support estate has value only in conjunction with the surface rights or the
mineral rights so that the property unit in question is either the bundle
of rights in the combined surface/support estates or combined mineral/support estates.286 More controversial, however, is Justice
Steven's statement that, even if the support estate were a separate segment of property, the petitioners held support estates for "a great deal
of land" and "[t]he record is devoid of any evidence on what percentage of the purchased support estates, either in the aggregate or with
respect to any individual estate" had been affected. 287 The perplexing
aspect of this language is the suggestion that the extent of interference
with property rights can be measured with respect to the petitioners'
holdings of support estates in the aggregate. This approach seems to
be a measurement of the economic impact of the regulation on the
property owner rather than on the property itself. Does this approach
mean that the greater the holdings of the disgruntled landowner the
less likely it is to be a taking? Could Justice Brennan in Penn Central,
for example, have measured the economic interference of the
landmark restrictions not just against the "parcel as a whole" but
against all of Penn Central's property in the immediate vicinity (or
perhaps those properties to which the TDR's could have been
transferred)?
What also emerges from Keystone is that Rehnquist's approach to
what constitutes a taking suffers from many of the definitional
problems for which he criticized Justice Brennan's approach in Penn
284. /d. at S 11 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
28S. Compare Penn Central Transport. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (Rchnquist, J., dissenting) with Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, S07 (1987)
(Rchnquist, C.J ., dissenting).
286. 470 U.S. at SOl.
287. /d.
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Central and Justice Steven's approach in Keystone itself. Justice Rehnquist concluded with little explanation that the 27 million tons of coal
are a separate property segment which had been taken. 288 Apparently
the amount of coal is irrelevant so that one ton of coal would be a
separate property segment. But what makes the coal a separate property segment? Would a prohibition on use of one natural resource be a
taking of a separate segment of property as well? For example, if a
local ordinance prohibited drainage affecting certain wetlands, thereby
precluding any use of water rights on a particular lot, would there be a
taking even if other outside water sources were available and there was
little or no economic impact on the value or use of the lot? Justice
Rehnquist does at times equate the coal with the right to mine it,
which is in turn equated with the support estate. Which of these is an
identifiable segment of property the destruction of which would be a
taking? Is any identifiable use of property a property right? Is the
question determined solely by state law so that results would vary
from state to state? If state law is not determinative, under Rehnquist's approach would there be a taking if the record demonstrated
that the coal company's mining rights were extinguished but it retained other valuable uses of the support state? Justice Rehnquist simply puts a great deal of emphasis on the recognition under
Pennsylvania law of the support estate as a separate estate and suggests no alternative framework to address beyond that context what is
a separate segment of property for takings law purposes.
What role, if any, state law will play in defining property rights
will be necessarily a recurring issue before the Court. The issue surfaced squarely in a case during the 1990 term in which the Court
avoided resolution of the taking issue altogether. In Preseau/t v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 289 the petitioners claimed a reversionary
interest under state law in an unused railroad right-of-way. A 1983
amendment to the National Trails System Act290 provided for conversion of unused railroad rights-of-way to recreational trails subject to
approval by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).291 The interim recreational use under the statute cannot be treated for any purpose as abandonment of the right-of-way, thus permitting the ICC to
approve conversion from "rails to trails" without regard to reversionary property interests under state law. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals had concluded that state property law was subject to the
ICC's plenary authority to regulate so that no reversion could occur
288.
289.
290.
291.

ld. at 517-18 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Ito S. Ct. 914 (1990).
16 u.s.c. §§ 1241-1251 (1988).
Id § 1247(d).
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under state law until the ICC had issued a certificate of abandonment. 292 The majority opinion of the Supreme Court held that the
taking claim was premature until the petitioners had pursued their
remedies under the Tucker Act, 293 expressing no opinion on this aspect of the ruling by the court of appeals. 294
However, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Scalia and Kennedy, concurred separately on the relevance of state law to the taking
issue. To determine whether a taking has occurred, Justice O'Connor
argued that the "basic axiom" is that" '[p]roperty interests ... are not
created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understanding that stem from an
independent source such as state law.' " 29' The concurring opinion
concluded that the Preseaults' property rights should be determined
by state law without reference to the ICC's authority or actions. 296
Given the well established and plenary authority of the ICC in
railroad regulation, the factual circumstances in Preseault presented a
more compelling case for definition of property rights under federal
law than would normally be the. case when a takings challenge is
presented. Yet three justices of the Court concurred separately to recognize the paramount importance of state law in defining property
rights for purposes of the takings clause. In light of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's dissent in Keystone, it would appear that at least four justices, and possibly five (given Justice Powell's participation in the Keystone dissent) would find state law to be dispositive in defining
property rights.
The leeway given the state in Penn Central was further eroded by
the Supreme Court's next decision under the takings clause. In First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 297 the
Supreme Court directly held, after years of avoiding the issue, that a
damages remedy must be provided for regulatory "takings" under the
fifth amendment as applicable to the states under the fourteenth
amendment. In an earlier series of cases finding that there was clearly
no taking or that the lower courts had not yet found a taking, 298 the
292. Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 883 F.2d 145, 150-51 (2d Cir. 1988), aff'd, 110
S.Ct. 914 (1990).
293. 28 u.s.c. § 1491 (1988).
294. ItO S.Ct. at 922.
295. /d. at 926 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,
1001 (1984)).
296. /d. at 926-928 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
297. 482 u.s. 304 (1987).
298. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo City, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); Williamson County
Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); San Diego Gas & E1ec. Co. v. San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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Supreme Court had refused to decide either the point at which a regulation so interferes with property rights that there is a de facto taking
of the property without just compensation or what the appropriate
remedies for .such a taking might be. Lutheran Church was addressed
to the second of these two issues, the appropriate remedy for a taking.
Lutheran Church involved property located in a watershed area,
on which the church had operated a retreat center and recreational
area for handicapped children. 299 After a severe flood destroyed the
buildings, Los Angeles county adopted an interim ordinance prohibiting the construction or reconstruction of any structure in an interim
flood protection area, which included the church's land. 300 In one of
its claims, the. church sought the remedy of inverse condemnation for
the regulatory taking of the church's property. 301 In holding against
the plaintiff church, both the trial court and the California Court of
Appeals relied upon the distinction set out by the California Supreme
Court in Agins v. Tiburon 302 between the appropriate remedy for a
challenge to an ordinance that deprives a person of the total use of his
lands, as opposed to the remedy for a physical taking. Because Agins
ruled that the appropriate remedy for the former is declaratory relief
or mandamus, the courts rejected the church's inverse condemnation
cause of action. 303
Although several of the justifications utilized in earlier cases to
deny review were arguably presented in the Lutheran Church case, the
Supreme Court nevertheless stated in its opinion that mandamus and
declaratory relief are inadequate remedies for a regulatory interference
substantial enough to constitute a taking under the fifth and fourteenth amendments, and that such a taking requires just compensation
(that is, damages for the losses resulting from deprivation of property
use from the time that the interference occurs until the legislating entity either amends the offending regulation, withdraws the regulation,
or pays compensation for a permanent deprivation of the property
from the exercise of eminent domain). 304
Because the Court had to accept as true the allegation in the complaint that the Church had been denied all use of its property, the
Court gave no further delineation of what degree of interference would
299. 482 U.S. at 307.

300. Id.
301. Id.
302. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd on othe' grounds, 447 U.S. 255
(1980).
303. 482 U.S. at 308-309.
304. Id. at 321-22.
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amount to a taking. 305 In the opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell and
Scalia, the Court emphasized that the takings clause "was not
designed to limit governmental interference per se, but rather to secure
compensation in the event of a taking. " 306 As to the frequently asserted argument that providing damages compels eminent domain in
derogation of any of the government's other options, the Court
pointed out that after having to provide interim damages for the temporary taking, the government may still decide to amend the regulation, withdraw the regulation, or exercise eminent domain. 307 The
Court merely decided that " 'temporary' takings which . . . deny a
landowner all use of his property are not different in kind from permanent takings. . . ." 308
To some extent, the dissent's statement that the decision will
"generate a great deal of litigation" 309 exaggerates the true significance
of the opinion. The majority, following the dissent in San Diego Gas &
Electric Co. v. San Diego, 310 merely restated the rule that a regulation
can be a taking and that such regulatory takings are to be remedied by
damages. 311 Thus, the holding of the Court did not in and of itself
open the floodgates of litigation. What may do so, however, is the
. dicta as to when a taking will occur. Because the lower courts had
assumed that the floodplain statute denied the church all use of its
property, the Court did not question that the deprivation was anything
less. Yet the majority suggested that an interference which, if permanent, would be a taking, constitutes a taking even if of a limited
duration. 312
It is with this position that two of the dissenters, Justices Stevens
and Blackmun, most strongly differ. 313 They would find compensation appropriate only when the effects of a regulation are so severe that
"invalidation or repeal will not mitigate the 'taking' label." The dissenters, joined by Justice O'Conner, also argued that the majority addressed a takings issue not presented to the Court and improperly
applied federal constitutional law when California constitutional law
was determinative. 314
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id.
ld. at 315 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 321.
Id. at 318.
ld. at 322 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
450 U.S. 621, 654-55 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
482 U.S. at 314-16.
Id. at 318.
I d. at 328 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
/d. at 322-28, 33S-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The future delineation of what degree of regulatory interference
constitutes a taking will determine whether the flood of litigation will
be reduced to a trickle. Very few regulations deprive a landowner of
all use of the regulated property. In fact, on remand the legislation in
Lutheran Church was upheld. 315
Justice Brennan acknowledged for the majority in Penn Central
that the Supreme Court had been unable to develop any "set formula"
for determining when economic injury caused by governmental action
requires compensation and that each case necessitates "ad hoc, factual
inquiries." 316 The Court had little difficulty in determining that the
diminution in value of the property did not in itself constitute a taking
within the meaning of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, particularly in light of Penn Central's concession that the property was still
capable of earning a reasonable return. In determining the diminution
in value borne by Penn Central, the Court refused to define the affected property as "air rights;" it focused instead on the economic effects on the parcel as a whole, that is, the city tax block designated as
the landmark site. 317
It is clear from Rehnquist's Penn Central dissent that he views
deprivation of property, for purposes of the taking clause, as the deprivation of a property right or rights, and not as the deprivation of a
degree of economic return on some undefined physical unit of real
property. 318 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto 319 arguably for the first time
extended this reasoning to the conclusion that deprivation of a single
property right, the right to exclude others, may be a taking without
regard to the economic value of any remaining unaffected rights in the
property.
315. On remand from the Supreme Court decision, the California Court of Appeals held that the
floodplain ordinance was not a taking regardless of whether the appropriate test is that suggested in
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (requiring compensation ifa landowner is denied all uses
of the property) or that of First English (not requiring compensation for deprivation of all uses so long
as the deprivation promotes a substantial governmental interest). In attempting to reconcile the two
tests the court concluded:
It would not be remarkable at all to allow government to deny a private owner "all uses" of
his property where there is no usc of that property which docs not threaten lives and health.
So it makes perfect sense to deny compensation for the denial of "all uses" where health
and safety are at stake but require compensation for the denial of all uses where the land
usc regulation advances lesser public purposes.
First Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 893, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893, 901
(1989). The church retained some use of the property because the ordinance only prohibited reconstruction of structures damaged or demolished by floods and did not all'ect eight acres of the landowner's twenty-acre parcel.
316. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
317. Id. at 131.
318. ld. at 142-43 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
319. 467 u.s. 986 (1984).
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If Chief Justice Rehnquist's approach in Penn Central is adopted
in the future, it will be much easier to demonstrate a taking. Plaintiffs
will need only to show deprivation of one cognizable property right
(for example, the right to develop). Under Brennan's approach, as
illustrated by the majority opinion in Penn Central, however, the economic impact on the property as a whole will be evaluated to determine whether the regulatory interference goes so far as to be a taking
without just compensation. If Chief Justice Rehnquist's view prevails,
the ftoodgates will be opened because deprivation of a single cognizable property right may be viewed as a taking necessitating a remedy of
damages.
The crowning blow to traditional takings jurisprudence after
Penn Central came with a decision involving coastal zone management, Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n. 320 In Nollan, the California Coastal Commission granted a permit to replace a bungalow on a
beachfront lot located between two public beaches, with the condition
that the owners allow public easement across their beach. 321 The California Court of Appeals had found that there was no taking because
the condition did not deprive the landowner of all reasonable use of
their property. 322 In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, joined by
Justices White, fowell, O'Connor, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
Supreme Court equated the condition for the permit with a permanent
physical occupation of the property and stated that "the 'right to exclude [others] is 'one ofthe most essential sticks in the bundle of rights
that are commonly characterized as property:' " 323 The Court declined to phrase the issue in terms of rights of access to navigable waters under California law. Instead the Court relied upon Monsanto
and stated that the "right to build on one's own property" is not a
"governmental benefit" easily erased by a governmental
pronouncement. 32~
In stating the test for a taking, Justice Scalia used the same test
Justice Stevens used in the majority opinion in Keystone: a regulation
is not a taking if it " 'substantially advances legitimate state interests'
and does not 'den[y] an owner economically viable use of his
land.' " 32 s The majority accepted as legitimate the public purposes
stated by the California Commission for the conditional permit: "pro320.
321.
322.
323.
(1982)).
324.
325.

483 u.s. 825 (1987).
/d. at 827-29.
/d. at 830.
/d. at 831 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433

/d. at 833-34 n.2.
/d. at 834 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
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tecting the public's ability to see the beach, assisting'the public in overcoming the 'psychological barrier' to using the beach created by a
developed shorefront, and preventing congestion on the public
beaches."326
If the Commission had denied the permit altogether, there would
have been no taking regardless of which of the two measurements for a
taking in Keystone was utilized. On the other hand, if the Commission
had simply demanded that the Nollans provide lateral access to the
beach, the requirement of physical access would have been a per se
taking. The question then becomes whether conditioning the permit
on a grant of lateral access amounted to a taking. To evaluate that
question, Justice SCalia found it necessary to address the complex area
of unconstitutional conditions-that a state cannot impose an unconstitutional requirement as a condition for granting a privilege. He accepted, "for purposes of discussion," the Commission's proposed test
that the condition must be reasonably related to the public need or
burden created or exacerbated by the Nollan's proposed development,
and concluded that the Commission's own test had not been met:
It is quite impossible to understarid how ·a requirement that people
already on the public beaches be able tow~ across the Nollans'
property reduces any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the
new house. It is also impossible to understand how it lowers any
"psychological barrier" to using the public beaches, or how it
helps to remedy any additional congestion on them caused by construction of the Nollans' new house. 327

Justice Scalia emphasized that the proposed public access would run
parallel to the coast and have no relationship to remedying reduced
visual access from construction of the larger house.
·
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan, joinep by Justice Marshall, sharply criticized the majority's limitation of a state's discretion
in exercising its police power, a limitation "discredited for the better
part of this century." 328 Even accepting the restrictive requirement
that the regulation "substantially advance legitimate state interests,"
the dissent argued that the condition could still be upheld. 329 Finally,
under the more traditional taking analysis, these dissenting Justices
concluded no taking had occurred. 330
In criticizing the Court's interpretation of the police power, Justice Brennan referred to a long line of cases requiring only that the
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.

at 83S.
at 838·39.
at 842 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
(Brennan, J., dissenting).

/d. at 849 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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exercise of the state police power have a rational basis. 331 Ironically,
Justice Brennan noted, if the Commission had denied the permit altogether, there would have been no taking because the property would
still have been economically viable. 332 As to the purported lack of a
substantial link between the Commission's purposes and the condition,
Brennan countered that the "proposed development would reduce
public access by restricting visual access to the beach, by contributing
to an increased need for community facilities, and by moving private
development closer to beach property." 333 While emphasizing the reasonableness of the condition, Justice Brennan remarked: "The Commission is charged by both the state constitution and legislature to
preserve overall public access to the California coastline. Furthermore, by virtue of its participation in the Coastal Zone Management
Act program, the State must 'exercise effectively [its] responsibilities in
the coastal zone through the development and implementation of
management programs to achieve wise use of the land and water resources of the coastal zone,' 16 U.S.C. § 1452(2), so as to provide for,
inter alia, 'public access to the coas[t] for recreation purposes.' " 334
Given the purposes of the CZMA, the dissenters took issue with the
majority's conclusion that the Commission had only a "non-land use
justification.'' 335 The purpose of the Commission, they said, was to
preserve physical access as well as visual access. 336 According to the
dissent, requiring an unduly restrictive purpose/means test rather than
the traditional rational relation standard "could hamper innovative efforts to preserve an increasingly fragile natural resource. " 337 Beyond
the question of the state's interest, there could be no taking because
the Nollans retained economically viable use of the land. 338
Taking challenges to coastal regulation and to land use regulation
in general stand a much better chance of success after Keystone, Lutheran Church, and Nollan. The Court seems well on its way toward
recognizing complete deprivation of a right to develop property as a
taking. Although this trend may be detrimental to innovative land use
planning, it is certainly beneficial to the property owner challenging
regulation. It is unclear. how far deprivation must go to be a taking,
and the current trend is toward protection of individual property
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.

at 843-48 n.l (Brennan,1., dissenting).
at 844-45 (Brennan, 1., dissenting).
at 845 (Brennan, 1., dissenting).
at 846-47 (Brennan, 1., dissenting).
at 848 (Brennan, 1., dissenting).
(Brennan, 1., dissenting).
(Brennan, 1., dissenting).
at 855-60 (Brennan, 1., dissenting).
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rights at the expense of preservation and other rights in the public as a
whole. In the coastal context, protection of public access, absent assertions of public trust or a navigational servitude, seems less likely to
withstand a taking challenge. Under Nollan, many such restrictions
may be treated as physical interference with property rights and thus
be extremely susceptible to invalidation under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. Moreover, it is now clear that such a constitutional violation must be remedied by damages for the period of the restriction.
Restrictive regulation, such as restrictions to preserve open space, also
seem more vulnerable to attack. For example, in Paoli v. California
Coastal Commission, 339 the California Court of Appeals stated that a
property owner had neither a vested right to develop property in a
particular way nor a vested right to a coastal development permit.
Accordingly, the CCC's issuance of a permit conditioned on open
space preservation was upheld as rationally based. 340 After Nollan, a
property owner such as the one in Paoli would have an alternative
challenge as an unconstitutional taking. One remaining possible distinction between open space restrictions (and other similar restrictions) and access conditions is that open space requirements do not
require physical interference, which is still the type of interference
most susceptible to a taking challenge.
It remains to be seen whether Nol/an may be subject to a narrower interpretation. Commentators have suggested Nol/an establishes that a state may physically interfere with private property as a
condition to granting a development permit only if the strict means/
purpose fit is demonstrated. 341 This interpretation is predicated on
viewing Nollan as an exception or modification of the rule in Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 342 that permanent physical occupation of property by the government is a taking per se. If the Commission had simply required the Nollans to turn over an easement to
the Commission there unquestionably would have been a taking. On
the other hand, if the Commission had denied the permit outright,
there would have been no taking. In that sense, Nollan represents an
intermediate approach by which physical occupation as a permit condition would be subject to stricter scrutiny than most regulatory takings, but to lesser scrutiny than that mandated by Loretto. This
339. Paoli v. California Coastal Comm'n, 178 Cal. App. 3d 544, 223 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1986).
340. /d.
341. Compare Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause Is Neither Weak Nor
Obtuse, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1630 (1988) and Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1600
(1988) with Note, Taking a Step Back: A Reconsideration of the Takings Test ofNollan v. California
Coastal Commission, 102 HARV. L. REv. 448 (1988).
342. 458 u.s. 419 (1982).
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interpretation of Nollan also reconciles the case with established state
land use exaction cases. In such cases, state courts have upheld exactions for public amenities from developers in exchange for permits for
increased development creating the need for such amenities. 343
The criticism leveled by Justice Rehnquist at Justice Brennan's
approach in Penn Central remains: if a taking is judged by the diminution in value of the property as a whole, what is the appropriate property unit in any given case?
Although the deluge of litigation direly predicted by Justice Stevens in his First English dissent has not yet materialized, the Supreme
court trilogy of cases is having an impact on takings cases in the lower
courts. According to one commentator, from June of 1987 to October
1, 1989, there were 111 state and federal cases reported in which land
use regulation was challenged as a taking. 344 . Of these, only fourteen
of the sixty-two cases de9ided on the merits held that there had been a
taking-five federal cases and nine state cases. 34' Since First English,
as of December 31, 1990, there have been seven cases awarding damages for a taking against the federal government. 346
By any measurement these cases hardly represent a groundswell
of litigation threatening to paralyze land use regulation. To understand fully their significance, however, it is necessary to recall that
343. Note, supra note 341, at 467-68.
344. Looper-Friedman, Constitutional Rights as Property?: The Supreme Court's Solution to the
"Takings Issue," 15 CoLUM. J. ENvn.. L. 31, S9 (1990).
34S. ld at 60. In one of the more significant state cases, Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 74
N.Y.2d 92, S42 N.E.2d 10S9, S44 N.Y.S.2d S42, cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. SOO (1989), owners of a singleroom occupancy housing challenged the constitutionality of a municipal law that established a five-year
moratorium on conversion, alteration, or demolition of single-room occupancy housing and obligated
owners to restore all units to habitable condition and lease them at controlled rents for an indefinite
period. The owners of the properties challenged the law as an unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation.
The court held that the loss of possessory interest that occurs when owners are forced to accept
occupation of their properties by persons not already in residence results in deprivation of rights in
those properties sufficient to constitute a per se physical taking. Id at 103, S42 N.E.2d at 1063, S44
N.Y.S.2d at S46. Further, the court noted that the law was also a regulatory taking because the moratorium and anti-warehousing provisions denied the owners economically viable use of their properties.
ld at 107, S42 N.E.2d at 106S-66, S44 N.Y.S.2d at S49. The nexus between the burden of the property
owners and the alleviation of the social problem of homelessness was tenuous and failed the "meansend" test. ld at 112, S42 N.E.2d at 1069, S44 N.Y.S.2d at SS2. The law's buy-out, replacement, and
hardship exceptions did not mitigate the unconstitutional nature of the law. /d at 113-lS, S42 N.E.2d
at 1069-70, S44 N.Y.S.2d at SS2-S4.
346. The seven cases are Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 1S3 (1990); Florida
Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990); Shelden v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 247
(1990); Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 394 (1989), modified, 20 Cl. Ct. 324 (1990),
aff'd, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Yancey v. United States, 91S F.2d 1S34 (Fed. Cir. 1990); United
Nuclear Corp. v. United States, 912 F.2d 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1990); and Yuba Natural Resources, Inc. v.
United States, 821 F.2d 638 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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takings challenges were rarely successful as a matter of federal constitutional law after Penn Central. Therefore, even limited success in
these challenges, particularly against the federal government, is a significant departure from the trend in prior litigation and enough to engender caution on the part of land use planners when oontemplating
regulatory options. It seems only reasonable to assume that these
cases will continue to proliferate as the full repercussions of the
Supreme Court trilogy become apparent in the lower courts. In the
seven federal cases in which a taking has been found, the United States
Claims Court and Federal Circuit Court of Appeals have found it necessary to address not only how far regulatory interference must go to
be a taking, but also how to measure the damages once a taking has
been found.
In Florida Rock Industries v. United States, 341 the Court of
Claims, the primary forum for determination of taking claims under
section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 348 ·ruled that a permit denial for
limestone mining was a taking. 349 On appeal, 350 the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit reversed the Claims Court's holding that only
current uses and not future ones could be considered in determining
whether economically viable uses of the property remained, and thus
the court remanded the case for evaluation of the remaining value of
the property. 3S1
On remand, the United States Claims Court ruled that the value
of the property should be determined by examining a market of inves347. 8 Cl. Ct. 160 (1985), vacated, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), on remand, 21 Cl. Ct. 161
(1990).
348. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988). United States Claims Court has exclusive jurisdiction under the
Tucker Act over contractual claims against the United States exceeding $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1491
(1988). The government has defended against taking claims in federal district court successfully by
asserting that the district courts do not have jurisdiction. Want, Federal Wetlands Law: The Case and
the Problems, 8 HARV. ENvrL L. REv. I, 36 (1984); see, e.g., United States v. Mt. Vernon Memorial
Estates, Inc., 17 Env't Rep. Case (BNA) 2212, 2214 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (taking counterclaim); American
Dredging Co. v. Dutchyshyn, 480 F. Supp. 957, 961 (E.D. Pa.) (injunctive relief sought), aff'd, 614
F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1979); but see 1902 Atlantic Ltd. v. Hudson, 574 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Va. 1983)
(district court jurisdiction over injunctive relief); and Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164
(1979) (district court jurisdiction but government failed to contest jurisdiction).
349. Florida Rock Indus., Inc., 8 Cl. Ct. at 179.
350. 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
35 1. /d. at 905. One commentator has suggested that Florida Rock was a "strong candidate" for
a taking determination:
The plaintiff bought the property in 1972 for the specific purpose of mining limestone when
there were no applicable federal statutes that required a permit. The Corps' jurisdiction
was based on the need to temporarily deposit excavated material onto wetlands. The environmental values were not substantial. Most importantly, the permit denial deprived plaintiff of the only current economically viable use of the property.
Want, Federal Wetlands Litigation: 1986 to the Present, [Current Developments], 18 Env't Rep. (BNA)
2563, 2569 (April 29, 1988).
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tors speculating .on the property who were aware of the regulatory
limits on the use of that property. 3s2 The court therefore awarded
damages for the full fair market value of the property.
After concluding that the plaintiff's limestone mining on 98 acres
of a 1,560 acre tract did not fall within the nuisance exception to the
taking prohibition, the court's opinion focused on valuation of the
property before and after the permit denial. Upon finding that no
comparable sales were available, the court determined a value of
$10,500 per acre based on adjustments to the property's acquisition
cost to reflect "pre-permit-denial fair market value." 3 s3 As to postdenial value the Claims Court asserted that it would be "patently unreasonable to require plaintiff to prove the total absence of any value,
and more relevant ... , the absence of a market for the property." 3 S4
As the finder of fact the court had to "discount proposed uses that
[did] not meet a 'showing of reasonable probability that the land [was]
both physically adaptable for such use and that there is a demand for
such use in the reasonably near future.' " 3 ss The court concluded that
the proposed use of speculation was neither practicable nor reasonably
probable, so that the post-denial value of the property was $500 per
acre for "future recreational/water management" purposes rather
than $4,000 per acre for investment purposes. 3 s6 This 95% reduction
in value and the fact that the plaintiff had purchased the property
solely for the purpose of limestone mining was sufficient to demonstrate to the court that there had been a permanent taking. 3s7
Although the property had retained a residential value of $500 an
acre, the court ordered payment of the full fair market value at the
time of the taking, plus interest. 3 s8
In addition to the Florida Rock case discussed above, the Claims
Court in a companion case ruled that the Corps' denial of another
section 404 permit was a taking and awarded just compensation. In
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 3 s9 the Corps denied a permit
to develop residential housing on 11.5 acres of wetlands in a 250 acre
parcel, most of which had already been developed. On a summary
judgment motion, the court refused to measure the economic impact
352. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 169 (1990).
353. /d.
354. /d. at 170.
355. /d. at 172 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. 341.45 Acres of Land, 633 F.2d
108, Ill (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981)).
356. /d.
357. /d. at 175-76.
358. /d. at 176.
359. 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990).
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by the diminution in value of the entire 250 acres. 360 Following the
same method of analy~is as in Florida Rock, the Claims Court in determining the property's pre-denial value found that the highest and best
use was as a 40-lot residential development with a projected fair market value of $2,658,000. 361 The court held that there was no economically viable use of the property without a permit, even though the
post-denial value for the property of $1,000 per acre was based on the
remaining conservation and recreational uses of the property. 362 The
United States asserted that the property could be adapted for use for
hunting, agriculture, a mitigation site, or a marina. The court found
these contentions "unsupported" and without any evidence establishing a market for such uses. 363 Similarly, the court found no evidence
to demonstrate a market for the one acre of uplands the government
claimed could be developed and sold for up to $40,000. 364 The 99%
diminution in value, coupled with the court's earlier determination of
no countervailing substantial state interest, led the court to find a taking. 365 As in Florida Rock, the court ordered payment of the property's full market value at the time of the taking plus interest despite
its residual value of $12,500 after the taking. 366
Both courts emphasized in their opinions that no economically
viable use of the property in question remained after regulation, often
despite apparent conservation, agricultural, and recreational uses for
the property. The courts also appear to be utilizing the "before and
after" fair market value of the highest and best use of the property to
determine damages, an approach that results in higher damages than
many alternative formulations such as measuring damages to immediate use values. Although admittedly a very small sampling, these
cases suggest that landowners may well be succeeding with takings
challenges by showing that no development use remains in the property and then may recover for damage done to the potential developmental value rather than to the immediate use value of the property.
The Supreme Court decisions under the taking clause, if nothing else,
have created sufficient ambiguity in the area to encourage taking
claims when uses of property are substantially restricted.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.

/d. at I 54.
Id. at 157.
/d. at 158.
Jd. at 158-59.
Jd at 159.
Jd. at 160.
Jd. at 161.
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IV. THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND JUDICIARY
IN ENVIRONMENTAL PRESERVATION AS LAND USE
REGULATORS

What might otherwise appear to be. an unjustifiable failure by
Congress to give teeth to the CZMA can only be understood in the
historical context of the environmental movement and federal involvement in land use control in the United States. As a field, environmental law has just reached its twentieth year. The modern era of
environmental law is generally traced to the passage of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969. 367 NEPA was followed
by a succession of landmark environmental statutes in the 1970's regulating air pollution, water pollution, solid and hazardous waste, endangered species, and drinking water, among other environmental
concerns. Environmental destruction was addressed in this period by
legislation specifically directed to the environment, which either set up
a process for environmental evaluation, as in NEPA, or imposed controls on pollution sources, as in the Clear Air and Clean Water Acts.
In this heyday of environmental preservation, there was inestimable
faith in the command-and-control regulatory approach to environmental problems. In part this approach was predicated on a naive
assessment of environmental processes. If there was too much carbon
monoxide or sulfur dioxide in the atmosphere, Congress's response
was to require compliance with a technology-based standard for the
offensive pollutant or to create a health-based ambient quality standard with the intricacies of implementation left to the overburdened
Environmental Protection Agency.
The roots of the command-and-control approach to environmental regulation, however, went much deeper. Throughout ~he 1970's,
Congress repeatedly confronted and rejected any measures that even
approximated what could be considered federal land use controls.
From 1970 to 1975, approximately forty national land use bills that
would have established planning procedures for states supported by
federal funding were rejected by one or both houses of Congress, 368
even though the proposals would have left the actual planning process
to the states. The entrenched political resistance to "federal zoning"
ignored the fact that the federal government had been involved in land
use regulation since the 1700's. 369 Even while efforts for a national
367. 42 u.s.c. § 4321-4370b (1988).
368. See, e.g., Reilly, Transformation at Work: The Effect of Environmental Law on Land Use
Control, 24 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST 1. 33 (1989).
369. R. HYMAN, NATIONAL LAND USE POLICY LEGISLATION: A BIBLIOGRAPHY (1979); see
generally Johnson, Land Use Planning and Control by the Federal Government, in No LAND Is AN
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land use policy were failing in Congress, federal legislation was creating what Donald Hagman referred to as the "quiet federalization of
land use controls.'mo To avoid the appearance of federal zoning, even
the most expansive federal programs affecting land use (like the
CZMA in 1972 and the CBRA in 1982) were limited to funding of
state or local programs for land use regulation in accordance with federal standards371 or withdrawal of federal funding for environmentally
destructive activities.
By the late 1970s, a well-worn pattern for environmental regulation had been set. If an environmental problem could be addressed
through imposition of technological standards, Congress would mandate that approach. For environmental problems that seemingly had
to be addressed through land use controls, such as preservation of
floodplains and coastal zones, federal standards would set criteria for
voluntary state and local land use programs, with the incentive of federal funding for qualifying programs. 372
A new era of environmental regulation was ushered in with the
1980s. Ten years of technology-based standards had failed to produce
clean air and clean water or to rectify other environmental problems
such as contamination of groundwater with toxic waste. Economists
criticized the command-and-control approach to environmental preservation and succeeded in their call for increased use of cost/benefit
analysis and economic incentives in environmental decisionmaking.
The Reagan administration emphasized an expanded role for state and
local governments while decreasing federal funding for state and local
environmental programs. 373
IsLAND 75 (1975); N. LYDAY, THE LAW OF THE LAND: DEBATING NATIONAL LAND UsE LEGISLATION 1970-75 (1976); C. LAMB, LAND USE PoLmCS AND LAW IN THE 1970's 36-54 (1975).
370. A. Rl!rrzE, ENviRONMENTAL PI.Aro!NING: LAW OF LAND AND REsoURCES 1-10 (1974).
371. Hagman, A New Deal: TrtJding Windfalls for Wipeouts, in No LAND Is AN ISLAND 169, 173
(1975).
372. The different ways in which federal programs affect or dictate land use have been characterized as follows:
I. They directly regulate the use that may be made of land;
2. They fund state or local programs of land use 'regulations;
3. They require the preparation of plans to guide future land uses;
4. They construct, or pay for the construction of, facilities that use land and that may strongly
inftuence surrounding land uses; and
S. They provide a variety of stimulants and depressants to various segments of the economy that
inftuence the way private users of land behave.
F. BossELMAN, D. FEURER & T. RICHTER, fEDERAL LAND USE REGULATION 1-2 (1977).
373. "States will be encouraged to assume more responsibility for administering federal environmental laws through a combination of increased leeway to .conduct environmental programs and offers
of grant assistance, according to a policy statement signcid by Environmental Protection Agency Administrator William D. Ruckelshaus April 4." EPA Policy Encourages Greater State Role, Funding
Viewed as Key By Bipartisan Caucus, (Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 14 (Apr. 6, 1984).
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The modem era of state and local government involvement in
land use can be traced to the issuance in 1922 by the United States
Department of Commerce of the Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act 374 as a model for state delegation of zoning powers and the 1926
decision of the Supreme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 375 upholding the constitutionality of comprehensive zoning.
These two events would lead to virtually exclusive control of land use
by local governments for nearly fifty years. The counter-revolution in
land use was first recognized in 1971 in a seminal book entitled "The
Quiet Revolution in Land Use Control." 376 In that book, the authors
illuminated a growing trend in which state legislatures were reallocating land use authority from local governments to regional and statewide entities. This trend was reflected in the American Law
Institute's Model Land Development Code. 377 Adopted in 1975, the
Code was the result of a twelve-year study of the Standard Zoning
Enabling Act, the Standard City Planning Enabling Act, and state legislation based upon the acts. Article seven of the Model Code provides for an expanded state role in land use regulation through state
review of local decisionmaking in critical areas and for major developments. Although the United States Senate would pass the Land Use
Policy and Planning Assistance Act of 1973, 37·8 based roughly on arti- "
cle seven of the Code, 379 the legislation did not pass in the House of
Representatives. The Act would have provided federal funding to
states regulating areas of critical state concern, developments of regional benefit, large-scale development, and areas impacted by key facilities such as major airports and highway interchanges.
Undeniably the dissatisfaction with local regulation was in part
due to social problems created by fragmented, uncoordinated growth
controls. Yet it is questionable whether this quiet revolution would
have taken place without the environmental awareness of the late
1960s and 1970s. The growing sophistication in the science of ecology
in this period directly led to an understanding of the need for regional
and state controls to protect an entire ecosystem. The shift in the concept of property-as-commodity to property-as-resource necessitated a
fundamental rethinking of the ultimate goals of all land use regulation.
374. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF CoMMERCE, ADVISORY COMMI1TI!E ON ZoNING, A STANDARD
.
STATE ZoNING ENABLING ACT (rev. ed. 1926).

31S. 272 U.S. 36S (1926).
376. F. 8ossELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CoNTROL (1971).
377. MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CoDE, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTI! (Proposed Official Draft
1975).
378. S. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
379. MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTI! (Proposed Official Draft
1975).
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To their credit, states as well as local governments began to experiment with innovative land use techniques. A number of states
adopted legislation based on article seven of the Model Code to protect
critical areas and regulate developments of regional impact or benefit. 380 State and regional regulation in most states did not usurp local
zoning powers so much as create an additional layer of regulation or
oversight for local decisionmaking in accordance with the Model Code
approach. Within such a framework, local governments increasingly
utilized methods such as planned unit developments, open space zoning, and transferable development rights to preserve natural resources
and protect environmental values.
State and local governments in the late 1980's have also taken the
initiative in environmental regulation that was thought to be the exclusive province of the federal government in the 1970's. With respect to
pollution controls, states have taken advantage of provisions in the
Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act that allow states to impose
stricter controls than the federal acts require. 381 Freed from the restraints of preemption, the states have responded with such stringent
controls that industries confronted with varying state standards are
lobbying for federal preemption. 382 Local governments have aggressively become involved in regulation to equalize the burdens from environmental risks, for example, enacting right-to-know ordinances
requiring disclosure of risks from hazardous waste and land use ordinances to regulate (or prohibit) hazardous waste facilities contaminating groundwater within their jurisdiction. Despite fears of local
protectionism, local environmental regulation has proliferated383 to fill
in the gaps of federal environmental regulation, most notably through
the mechanism of land use regulation so ardently avoided at the federal level. Nowhere is this new state environmentalism better represented than in coastal zone management, although state efforts have
been hampered by inadequate funding. In addition to the problem of
inadequate funding, state-imposed land use controls increasingly have
fallen victim to the spectre of the takings clause which has loomed
large over land use regulation since a shift in takings jurisprudence in
the late 1980's.
Ironically, the so-called quiet revolutions in allocation of land use
380. See generally, Bosselman, Raymond & Persico, Some Observations on the American Law
Institutes Model Land Development Code, in THE LAND USE AWAKENING: ZONING LAW IN THE
SEVENTIES 103-04 (1981).
381. See generally THE LAND UsE AWAKENING, note 380, supra.
382. For a few examples of such state laws, see Begley, E Pluribus, Plures, Newsweek, Nov. 13,
1989 at 70-72.
383. /d. at 72.

770

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

authority and environmental regulation coincided with a not-so-quiet
revolution in takings jurisprudence from the Supreme Court. The trilogy of cases in the 1987 term 384 created even greater uncertainty as to
what constitutes a taking than had been the case in the 1970s. If anything clearly emerged from these opinions, it was that a new coalition
was forming on the Court which appeared more predisposed to find a
taking by restrictive land use regulation. The coalition had not coalesced, however, to the point of agreement on what degree of economic
deprivation constitutes a taking. Yet, while state and local governments were moving away from the concept of property-as-commodity
to property-as-resource, a tenuous majority of the Court seemed inclined to evaluate land use regulation solely for its interference with
the developmental value of property.
Not surprisingly under these circumstances, the "psychological"
impact of the Court's decisions has far exceeded their scope as a matter of law. 38' Any intrusive, non-traditional land use regulation is
likely to be confronted with threats of litigation from landowners. It is
surprising under these circumstances that state and local governments
have continued to experiment with land use techniques and to pursue
environmental preservation of the coasts with the vigor that they have
demonstrated in recent years. Yet the impact of the Supreme Court
trilogy is undeniable. In short, state governments are stuck between a
rock and a hard place when it comes to any environmental regulation
of land use. On the one hand, they confront the public pressures for a
better environment, expanding federal requirements for environmental
programs, and the need for experimentation with regional, statewide,
and interstate land use controls. On the other hand, they are confronted with decreased federal funding, resistance from private landowners to growth restrictions, and the inestimable risk of monetary
damages for a regulatory taking. The outcome of this conflict in
coastal zone management and in the more general context of environmental management will depend on two essential variables-further
refinement by the Supreme Court of the takings clause and the priority
to be given federal funding of state and local environmental programs
·
in Congress.
At this juncture, there is no indication that the need for environmental regulation through land use will somehow diminish, particularly for the coasts. Since the Stratton Commission report in 1969, the
384. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); and Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
385. See generally Comment, An Assessment of the Role of Local Government in Environmental
Regulation, S UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 14S (1986).

1991]

THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT ACT

771

energy crisis has occurred, the environmental movement has arisen
and proliferated, and centuries of the law of the sea has undergone
dramatic changes. If anything, renewed commitment to the CZMA is
more important to strike a balance between development and preservation in the coastal zone than it was when the Act was passed. It is
unrealistic to assume that states alone, in the guise of "states' rights,"
should bear the financial responsibility for management of coastal areas of national significance.
There is no question that the 1990 amendments to the CZMA
were intended by Congress to give new strength to the Act, 386 but in
the all too familiar ways. The two incentives for state programsfederal funding and consistency review for federal activities-were increased and broadened respectively. The Coastal Energy Impact
Fund, never adequately funded to serve its purposes, was abandoned
for the much more limited Coastal Zone Management Fund which
covers any special, designated costs of administration that states may
incur with a program. Rather than redefine with more precision the
substantive land use requirements for state programs to address the
most pressing problems of coastal protection, Congress created two
new grant programs for nonpoint source pollution and for eight identified areas needing "enhancements" in state programs.
In creating these two programs, Congress did take one small step
away from vague policy directives toward more substantive federal
regulation. After two years of extensive federal involvement in land
use, it is time the taboo on federal land use was acknowledged as a
myth not worth preserving. Substantive federal standards for designation of coastal zones and acceptable land uses within them do limit
state and local land use authority, but do not by any means completely
usurp their authority. Given the states' expanding role as guardians of
the environment, political resistance to such an innovation may be
overestimated in any event.
From a public policy perspective, land use decisionmaking with a
local or regional impact should remain the prerogative of state and
local governments. Zoning decisions between competing commercial
and residential uses, for example, are best resolved in a forum in which
the parties concerned and affected by .the decision may make their
views known and, ultimately, express their approval or disapproval of
official action in the electoral process. On the other hand, it is un386. The House conference report on the amendments states that the section on the findings and
purposes of the amendments were meant to emphasize "the ever increasing pressures on coastal zone
resources and the need to improve state management programs to meet those challenges." H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 964, IOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 969, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2374,
2674.
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thinkable that preservation of environmental quality would be left to
state and local governments. The American public in recent years has
been made well aware of the necessity for environmental regulation at
the federal level and has come to accept its pervasiveness as the only
way in which environmental values may be preserved. The problem
simply put is that there is no talismanic distinction between environmental and land use regulation with respect to preservation of critical
environmental resources such as wetlands, coastal zones, and floodplains. Once this artificial distinction between the two types of regulation is recognized, we are free to examine whether in a given case the
original justifications for reserving land use to state and local governments hold true.
It is unrealistic to expect that coastal zones will be protected adequately as an interrelated ecosystem without substantive, minimum
federal standards any more than suitable air quality could ever have
been achieved or maintained by the federally funded state programs
prior to passage of the Clear Air Act in 1970. When preservation of a
critical environmental ecosystem is at stake, there is a need for federal
intervention that transcends state and local prerogatives, because the
parties affected by the decisionmaking (and thus the forum in which
those decisions should be made) are no longer limited to those persons
living in the immediate vicinity of the resource. In that sense, controlling development that will impair the environmental values of coastal
resources is better characterized as "environmental regulation" to be
addressed at the federal level than "land use" regulation reserved to
state and local governments. The consistency review process could
benefit from federally imposed exclusions of particularly fragile coastal
areas, such as wildlife refuges and habitats for endangered species,
from the leasing process, a limited reform that Congress has imposed
already on a case-by-case basis. In all other cases, the mediation authority of the Secretary should be clearly delineated as to when and
how conflicts between environmental values and energy needs should
be resolved. Admittedly, such standards are difficult to formulate, but
the present system leaves the states and federal agencies to make these
determinations without the benefit of Congress' evaluation of national
priorities.
The Supreme Court's taking jurisprudence, of course, is not susceptible to such reforms. When the Court does formulate a test for the
degree of economic interference necessary for a taking, hopefully its
judgment will be informed by the modem notion of property-as-resource. The Court's most recent taking decisions do nothing to foster
that hope, however, nor do many of its other environmental decisions.
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For example, the Supreme Court decisions under the CZMA are consistent with the Court's approach under NEP A, which delays consideration of environmental factors in a way that precludes meaningful
evaluation of projects that impact on the environment. Congress can
intervene, however, to overrule the Court's interpretation of the
CZMA as it did with Secretary of the Interior v. California.
Renewed commitment to the CZMA is particularly crucial in the
near future. The newly claimed exclusive economic zone extending
200 miles seaward from the coast will require planning and balanced
development, which cannot be done without cooperation between state
and federal governments. 387 Management of the coastal zone necessitates federal cooperation in addressing issues such as ocean incineration and dumping, ocean mining, and extended fishing rights. Coastal
protection is on the verge of slipping into a sea of budget cuts and
political battles over state and federal power that ignore the deficiencies of the Act itself. Without a renewed commitment to coastal regulation, what progress has been made in the delicate balance of state
and federal cooperation and coastal development and preservation will
be irreparably destroyed.

387. In Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976), the Supreme Court held that a federal study
of the northern Great Plains region for resource development was not yet a "proposal" for federal
action triggering the requirement of an environmental impact statement, although the study clearly was
prepared in preparation for development of the area.

